

probably not equalled the ideal greatness of Greece in the Periclean age, the brilliancy of the Renaissance in Italy, or the great discoveries of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in France and England. But what our century has done is this: it has worked out and deposited in special terms of language a clearer view of the correct methods for extending knowledge, and a peculiar conception of its possible unity. At one time—and that not very long ago—the word truth seemed to indicate to the seeker not only the right method and road for attaining knowledge, but also the end, the crown of knowledge. “Truth, and nothing but truth,” seems still to the popular mind the right maxim for seeking knowledge—the whole truth stands before it as the unity of all knowledge, were it found. I think it is now sufficiently clear to the scientific inquirer, as well as to the philosopher, that love of truth, while it does indeed denote the moral attitude of the inquiring mind, is insufficient to define either the path or the end of knowledge. “What is truth?” is still the unsolved question. The criteria of truth are still unsettled. It would, indeed, be a sorrowful experience, a calamity of unparalleled magnitude, if ever the moral ideas of truth and faith should disappear out of the soul of either the active worker or the inquiring thinker; but it is with these as with other treasures of our moral nature, such as goodness and holiness, beauty and poetry—our knowledge of them does not begin, nor does it increase, by definition; and though in the unthinking years of our childhood we acquire and appropriate these moral possessions through the words of our mother-tongue, they rarely gain in depth or meaning by logical distinctions which we may learn,

4.  
Nineteenth century, what it has achieved: a. Method of knowledge; b. unity of knowledge.

5.  
Search after truth not the end of knowledge, only the attitude of the inquiring mind.