

belonging to human thought can this unity be grasped, by what words of human speech can it be expressed?

Both Mr Herbert Spencer's 'System' and Lotze's 'Microcosmus' are written with the object of establishing the unity of thought, of preserving the conviction that things exist and that events happen in some intelligible connection, and especially that the religious and the scientific views of the world and life are reconcilable. But whereas Mr Spencer is content to point to the underlying unity as the Unknowable, and then betakes himself to the study and exposition of the manner in which events follow and things develop, Lotze considers the whole of this part of philosophy as merely an introduction to the solution of the real problem. To him a process of development is merely the outer form in which some real substance presents itself, a mechanical method by which something of higher value is accomplished. He admits the all-pervading rule of such a mechanism, but he urges the necessity of finding the substance itself, and of gaining a view of the end and aim which is to be attained by this array of processes, by this parade of mechanical means, of the interest that attaches to them, and the result which is to be secured.¹ Knowing the mechanism by which a certain object is accomplished, we may be able to calculate phenomena and events, but to understand² them requires a

¹ The earliest passage in which Lotze gives us a pretty complete idea of his philosophical methods and aims is to be found in his polemical pamphlet against Fichte the younger ('Streitschriften,' Leipzig, 1857, p. 52 sqq.) He there also reviews his attitude to the idealistic school of German Philosophy

and to Herbart, whose follower he refuses to be called (*ibid.*, p. 5 sq.) It is evident that at that time his system was not yet definitely settled in his mind (p. 58).

² The difference between calculating and understanding phenomena is probably to be traced to Leibniz. Lotze emphasises this difference.