A HISTORY

OF

EUROPEAN THOUGHT

IN THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY


BY

JOHN THEODORE MERZ



In Four Volumes

1907-1914


VOLUME I



William Blackwood and Sons
Edinburgh and London.

This electronic edition prepared by Dr. David C. Bossard
from original documents in his personal library.


August, 2006.

Copyright © 2006 by David C. Bossard.



CONTENTS.


PREFACE  v  vi  vii


INTRODUCTION.

 001  002  003  004  005  006  007  008  009  010  011  012  013  014  015  016  017  018  019  020  021  022  023  024  025  026  027  028  029  030  031  032  033  034  035  036  037  038  039  040  041  042  043  044  045  046  047  048  049  050  051  052  053  054  055  056  057  058  059  060  061  062  063  064  065  066  067  068  069  070  071  072  073  074  075  076  077  078  079  080  081  082  083  084  085

I. Thought, the hidden world, 1; The only moving principle, 2; History of Nature, how to be understood, 2; Not intelligible without intellect, 2; History of savage tribes, what is it? 3; Two ways in which thought enters into history, 4; Definition of thought impossible, 4; Relation of outer and inner worlds undefined, 5; Many meanings of thought, 5; Thought of the present. age, 6; Contemporary history, to what extent possible and valuable, 6; Supposed objectivity of historians, 7; Value of contemporary records, 8; Mystery of the life of thought, 8; Latent thought the material for genius, 8; Contemporary record of thought more faithful, 10; Events of the immediate past, 10; Changes of language, 11; Coining of new words, 12; Object of this work, 13; Not a political history, nor a history of science, literature, and art, 13; Influences which have a result on our inner life, 14; Personal knowledge necessary, 14; American influence only touched upon, 14; Only French, German, and English thought treated, 15; Unity of thought, a product of this century, 16; Voltaire, 16; Adam Smith, 16; Coleridge and Wordsworth, 17; Mme. de Staël, 17; Paris the focus of science, 17; Babbage, Herschel, and Peacock, 18; Liebig's laboratory, 18; Comte's philosophy, 18; Constable's influence in France, 19; Science become international, 19; The light which etymology throws on the history of thought, 20; Goethe, 22; Peculiarity of the German language, 22; New thought has found new words, 23; De BonaId and Max. Müller, 23; Thought, how expressed in French and German, 24; Philosophy of history, 25; Want of precise terms in German and French, 26; Carlyle, 26.

[014] I feel obliged to limit myself to European Thought. Such a limitation would hardly have been called for a century ago, because it would have been a matter of course; but the steady growth and peculiar civilization of a new and vigorous people on the other side of the Atlantic force frome me the twofold confession, that there is a large world of growing importance of which I have no personal knowledge, and to estimate which I therefore feel unqualified and unprepared; and further, that I am equally unable to picture to myself the aspect which the whole of our European culture in its present state may assume to an outside and far-removed observer who is placed in the New World. As this New World grows not only in numbers and national wealth, but also in mental depth, as it becomes more and more intellectualised and spiritualised, so it will no doubt experience the desire of recording its own inner life and culture... but the tendencies of thisnew culture are to me vague and enigmatical, and I frankly admit that I am unable to say anything definit on this subject.

[015] The subject before us is European Thought -- i.e. the fhought of France, Germany, and England -- during the greater part of the nineteenth century.


IL The two factors of intellectual progress, 27; Object of the book, 28; Nineteenth century, what it has achieved: (a) Method of knowledge; (6) Unity of knowledge, 29; Search after truth, 29; Method of science, practised by Galileo, &c., defined by Bacon, &c., 30; Disintegration of learning, 30; Apparent distance between science and poetry, 31; Closer connection between science and life, 31; What has nineteenth century done for the ideals? 32; Deeper conception of the unity of human interests, 33; Different terms for expressing this unity, 33; Definition of thought, 33; Age of encyclopedic treatment of learning, 34; Unity of knowledge gradually lost sight of, 35; Lectures on "Encyclopädie" in Germany, 37; Encyclopaedias did not fulfil their promise, 39; French were masters in science in beginning of the century, 41; Reaction in Germany against metaphysics, 43; Reform in school literature, 44; Germany has taken the lead in studying the life of thought, 46; Transition from metaphysical to historical method, 47; Herbert Spencer, 48; Lotze, 48; Herder's 'Ideen,' 50; Humboldt's 'Kosmos,' 51 ; Lotze's 'Microcosmus,' 52; What the mental life of mankind consists of, 55; Methods have their day and cease to be, 56.

[030] In the place of the high-sounding but indefinable search after truth, modern science has put an elaborate method of inquiry: this method has to be learnt by patient practice, and not by listening to a description of it. It is laid down in the works of those modern heroes of science, from Galileo and Newton onward, who have practised it successfully, and from those writings philosophers from Bacon to Comte and Mill have -- not without misunderstanding and error -- tried to extract the rationale.

[049]  Both Mr. Herbert Spencer's 'System' and [Rudolph Hermann - ed.] Lotze's 'Microcosmus' are written with the object of establishing the unity of thought, of preserving the conviction that things exist and that events happen in some intelligible connection, and especially that the religious and the scientific views of the world and life are reconcilable.  ... The other great work was that of A. v. Humboldt [footnote: 'Kosmos'], who in the course of a long career, peculiarly favoured by opportunities for studying Nature on an extensive scale, and for appreciating the detail of modern reserach, of which he was an illustrious representative, had never lost sight of the all-pervading unity.

III. Necessity of choosing a road, 57; No central event in our age, 68; Is history of thought history of philosophy? 60; Goethe's work involves the deepest thought of the century, 61; Philosophy retrospective, 62; Two questions, 63; Speculation, 64; Philosophy defined, 65; Division of the book, 65; Neither science nor philosophy exhausts "thought," 66; Thought also hidden in literature and art, 66; Goethe's and Wordsworth's influence, 67; Unmethodical thought, 68; Summed up in term "religious thought," 69; Science is exact, 69; Subjective interests, 70; Philosophy intermediate between exact science and religion, 71; Threefold aspect of thought: scientific, philosophical, individual, 72; Difficult to separate the three aspects, 74; French thought centred in science, 75; State of philosophy in England, 75; Goethe's 'Faust' representative of the thought of the century, 76; A period of ferment, 76 ; Caused by the Revolution, 77; Thought of century partly radical, partly reactionary, 77; Byronic school, 78; Revolutionary theories, 79; Thought to be considered as a constructive power, 80; Darwin, Spencer, and Lotze, 81; Romanticism, 82; Scientific thought to be dealt with first, 84; Hegel's doctrine, 85.


PART I. -- SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT.

Three chapters on the growth and the diffusion of the scientific spirit in the first half of the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER I.

THE SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT IN FRANCE.


 089  090  091  092  093  094  095  096  097  098  099  100  101  102  103  104  105  106  107  108  109  110  111  112  113  114  115  116  117  118  119  120  121  122  123  124  125  126  127  128  129  130  131  132  133  134  135  136  137  138  139  140  141  142  143  144  145  146  147  148  149  150  151  152  153  154  155  156


Our century the scientific century, 89; Difference of English and Continental notions of science, 91; Relation of science and life, 92; Foreseen by Bacon, 93; Defect in Bacon's Philosophy, 94; Corrected by Newton, 95; Bacon's and Newton's ideas taken up by French philosophers: Bacon and Newton compared, 96; Laplace's work, 97; French Academy of Sciences, 99; Continental methods in mathematics, 100; Modern analytical methods, 102; Older synthetical methods, 103; Influence of science on French literature, 104; Absence of this influence in England and Germany, 106; Schools of science in Paris, 106; Promoted by Governments of Revolution, 108; Condorcet, 110; Lakanal, 111; École normale, École polytechnique, 112; Monge's 'Descriptive Geometry,' 114; Science of Chemistry, 114; New mathematical sciences, 116; Crystallography, 116; Theory of probability, 118; Laplace gained his results by disregarding "individuality," 124; The centre of interest in the sciences of life, 125; Into this centre Cuvier carried exact research, 128; Cuvier's training, 133; Cuvier the greatest representative of the Academic system, 136; Science during the Revolution and First Empire, 138; Popular. isation of science in France, 142; Literary and national popularisation, 142; Dangers of the former, 143; The Revolution added the practical popularisation, 145; Influence of the first Napoleon on science, 149; Napoleon favoured the mathematical sciences, 151; Discountenanced contemporary philosophy, 152; Used statistical methods, 153; Prominence given deservedly to French names by Cuvier, 155.

[91] The great inventions of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries were made without special scientific knowledge, and frequently by persons who possessed skill rather than learning.

[122] Laplace [an inventor, with Newton, of calculus, the science of infinitesimals - ed], like so many other men of science, had been called by the Emperor [Napoleon] to assist in the labours of administration, but, according to his judgment, proved himself a poor administrator, being unable to grasp practical issues, and always descending into infinitesimals. It is hardly to be doubted now, after the lapse of a century, that the infinitesimals of Laplace play a more important par4t in problems of administration and government than the ideas of Napoleon.

[138 - Cuvier on the effects of the French Revolution]. "There is always a revolution required in order to change habits which have become general... The events which disturbed the world, and which for natural science temporarily dried up the sources of its riches, obliged it to return to itself, and to make a new study of what it possessed, more fruitful than the most fortunate departures could have been. During this apparent rest, all the different parts of method were deepened; the interior of natural objects was studied; even minerals were dissected and reduced to their mechanical elements; a still more intimate analysis was made by a perfected chemistry; the earth itself was, during this interval, if the expression is allowable, dissected by the geologists; its depts were sounded; the order and layers of rock which formed its shell were recognized... The botanists did not gather so many plants in their collections, but with the lens in hand they demonstrated more and more intimate structure of the fruit, the seed, the various relations which connect the parts of the flower... The most delicate forms of organic tissues were exhibited; medicine and chemistry united their efforts to appreciate in the minutest detail the action of external elements on the living organism. ... The old natural history had ceased to rule. It was not that old natural history any more, but a science full of life and youth, armed with quite novel ways and means, which beheld the world reopened by the Peace [at the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars - footnote]."

[141 - Cuvier on the effect of the suppression caused by the French revolution] The Convention had destroyed academies, colleges, universities; nobody would have dared to ask boldly for their restitution; but soon the effects of their suppression showed themselves in the most susceptible point; the armies were without doctors and surgeons, and these could not be created without schools. But who would believe that time was required to give courage enough to call them schools of medicine. Doctor and surgeon were titles too contrary to equality, apparently because there is no authority over the patient more necessary than that of the doctor; therefore the odd term 'schools of health' was used, and there was no question of either examination or diploma for the students."

[145 - on positive effects of the revolution]. The fundamental notions of a mechanical science... were expanded into a system of materialistic philosophy in 'L'Homme Machine,' the 'Système de la Nature,' and other works, the extreme views of which the great scientific thinkers could hardly approve of. Much of the good done by Fontenelle, by Voltaire, by Buffon, was spoiled or neutralised by premature and ill-founded theories. How much, or how little, they contributed to bring about the Revolution is a matter of much controversy; certain it is that the Revolution broke their sway, and destroyed their immediate influence. To the purely literary the Revolution added something different -- viz., the modern practical popularisation of science: it establiehed its educational and its technical importance. Science was to be not an elegant amusement, or a refined luxury, nor even exclusively the serious occupation of the rare genius: it was to be the basis of a national instruction, and the foundation of the greatness and wealth of the nation. The Memoirs of the Academy were cleansed of all dangerous generalizations which might have brought them into touch with political controversy; the language was confined to the measured and concise statement of facts, or to theories capable of mathematical verification and treatment; conjectural matter was carefully excluded, and a standard of scientific excellence, both in matter and form, was raised, to which we still look up with admiration. ... If now we continually appeal to scientific authorities for aid in the solution of practical problems, it is well to remember that nothing helped more to raise science to the eminence of a great social power than the action of the Revolutionary Government in 1793. Whilst it guillotined Lavoisier, Bailly, and Cousin; drove Dondorcet to suicide, and others lile Vicq-d'Azyr [footnote: the great forerunner of Cuvier in the new science of comparative anatomy] and Dionis du Séjour into premature death; it had to appeal for its most necessary requirements to the society of scientific authorities, which it professed not to need. ... In the space of a few years science had become a necessity to society at large.

[152 - on Napoleon] I cannot but recognise that he was, amongst the great heroes and statesmen of his age, the first and foremost, if not the only one, who seemed thoroughly to realise the part which science was destined to play in the immediate future. ... In the first decades of this century [19th] the home of the scientific spirit was France.




CHAPTER II.

THE SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT IN GERMANY.

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Foundation of German universities, 158; Development of the universities by the people, 159; Geographical distribution of the universities, 162; Full development of the German university system, 163; Philosophical faculty, 164; University of Göttingeu, 164; Relation of universities and high schools, 166; The university a training-school for research, 167; The ideal of Wissenschaft, 168; Developed under the German university system, 170; Reception of exact science in Germany, 174; Science not yet domiciled during the eighteenth century, 178; Scientific periodicals, 180; Gauss's mathematical researches, 181; Scientific spirit enters the universities in second quarter of century, 183; Jacobi's mathematical school, 185; Chemical laboratories established in 1826 through Liebig, 188; Cosmopolitan character of German science, 189; Liebig's organic analysis, 191; Biology a German science, 193; Cellular theory of Schleiden, 194; and Schwann, 195; Ernst Heinrich Weber, 196; and Johannes Müller, 197; Psychophysics, 198; Spirit of exact research and Wisscnsckaft, 202; Encyclopdic view necessary in philosophy and history, 203; Philosophy of Nature, 204; Conflict between the scientific and the philosophical views, 205; A. von Humboldt, 206; Influence of Berzeiius on German science, 208; Philosophy of Nature and medical science, 209; Science for its own sake, 211; Bequest of the classical and philosophical school, 211; Completeness and thoroughness of research, 213; Combination of research and teaching, 214; Combination of science and philosophy, 215; Biology grown out of science and philosophy combined, 216; Du Bois-Reymoud on Müller, 217; "Vital force" abandoned, 218; Mechanical view in biology, 219; Criticism of principles of mathematics, 221; The exact, the historical, and the critical habits of thought, 222.




CHAPTER III.

THE SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT IN ENGLAND.

 226  227  228  229  230  231  232  233  234  235  236  237  238  239  240  241  242  243  244  245  246  247  248  249  250  251  252  253  254  255  256  257  258  259  260  261  262  263  264  265  266  267  268  269  270  271  272  273  274  275  276  277  278  279  280  281  282  283  284  285  286  287  288  289  290  291  292  293  294  295  296  297  298  299  300  301

Scientific organisation abroad, 226; Similar institutions in Great Britain, 227; English science in the early part of the century, 229; Alleged decline of science in England, 230; Criticisms of Playfair, 231; Babbage's criticisms, 233; Foreign opinions on English science, 235; English replies to Babbage, 238; Foundation of the British Association, 238; Characteristics of higher mental work in England, 239; Academies and universities not always impartial, 240; Fourier, 241 ; Fresnel, 241 ; Plücker, 242; Grassmann, 243; Central organisation wanting in England, 243; Thomas Young, 244; Dalton, 245; Faraday, 246; Green, 246; Boole, 247; Babbage, 248; Characteristics of English thought, 249 ; Absence of schools of scientific thought, 250; Individual character and practical tendency of English science, 251 ; English peculiarities more pronounced during earlier part of the century, 252; Unique character of English universities, 254; Ideal of "liberal education," 255; Union of education and instruction, 258; Educational orgaulsations in England, 262; The Royal Institution, 264; Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society, 265; John Dawson of Sedbergh, 267; The Scotch Universities, 267; The Royal Society of Edinburgh, 269; The 'Edinburgh Review,' 270; The Analytical Society of Cambridge, 271 ; University life in Scotland, 271; The Dublin Mathematical School, 274; Importance of British contributions to science, 276; Diffusion of scientific knowledge on the Continent, 276; Isolation of English men of science, 277; Individualism of the English character, 279; Changes during the last fifty years, 280; British contributions to biology, 282; Jenner, 284; English love of nature, 284; Union of individualism and naturalism in England, 286; White of Selborne, 288; The Geological Society, 290; William Smith, 291; Charles Bell, 292; Historical Geography, 294; Martin William Leake, 296; Work of the three nations compared, 298.

[251] English societies may sometimes honour and admire, but they do not support, their great representatives, and these themselves often refuse to be tied by exclusive academic duties, still more by official restrictions. Two characteristics have marked most of them: they have, at all expense and sacrifice, guarded their individual freedom of thought, and they have almost always shown a great desire to combine some application with their abstract researches, to take part in the great practical work of the nation. Continental thinkers, whose lives are devoted to the realisation of some great ideal, complain of the want of method, of the erratic absence of discipline, which is peculiar to English genius.

[276] There is something casual and accidental about the great ideas which British men of science contributed during the first half of the century. each of them chooses an isolated position, a special form of delivery, frequently a language and style of his own. They attach little or no importance to the labours of others, with which they are frequently unacquainted. Important papers are lost or buried, as in the case of cavendish and Green. Novel ideas are communicated in unintelligible language and symbols, and accordingly neglected. This was the case with Dr. Young's writings, and to a certain extent with Faraday's. The greatest discoveries were unduly postponed through the absence of assistance, as seems to have been the case with Adam's discovery of Neptune, perhaps with Stoke's anticipation of spectrum analysis. What might not these great minds have accomplished had they attached the same importance to style and form as most of the great French men of science, or had they been called upon to teach a number of eager pupils, anxious, not to take honours and degrees, but to understand and further elaborate the suggestions of their masters, as has been the custom and tradition in Germany?

[290 on the formation of the Geological Society in 1807] At that time the war of the Wernerians and Huttonians, or, as they were also called, the Neptunists and Plutonists, was raging in the northern metropolis. The Geological Society of London was established with a view to "multiply and record observations, and patiently to await the result at some future period." -- that is, its founders resolved to apply themselves to descriptive geology, thinking the time not come for that theoretical geology which had then long fired the controversial ardour of Neptunists and Plutonists.



CHAPTER IV.

THE ASTRONOMICAL VIEW OF NATURE.

 302  303  304  305  306  307  308  309  310  311  312  313  314  315  316  317  318  319  320  321  322  323  324  325  326  327  328  329  330  331  332  333  334  335  336  337  338  339  340  341  342  343  344  345  346  347  348  349  350  351  352  353  354  355  356  357  358  359  360  361  362  363  364  365  366  367  368  369  370  371  372  373  374  375  376  377  378  379  380  381

The scientific spirit in the first and second half of the century, 302; Science become international, 303; Disappearance of national differences, 305; Special scientific ideas, 306; Philosophy of science, 306; Whewell's 'History' and 'Philosophy,' 309; Philosophy and science, 311; Leading scientific ideas mostly very ancient, 312; Mathematical spirit, 314; When first introduced into science, 317; Newton's 'Principia,' 318; The gravitation formula, 319; Lines of thought emanating from it, 321; Element of error, 323; Laplace and Newton, 328; Several interests which promote science, 326; Insufficiency of observation, 328; Practical interest, 328; Focalising effect of mathematical formuke, 332; Matter and force mathematically defined, 334; Weight and mass, 336; Gravitation not an ultimate property of matter, 338; Attraction and repulsion, 342; Electrical and magnetic action, 344; Law of emanations, 344; Molecular action, 346; The astronomical view: Cosmical, molar, and molecular phenomena, 348; Special interest attached to molar dimensions, 350; Geometrical axioms, 352; Difficulty of measuring gravitation directly, 353; Astronomical view of molecular phenomena, 354; Capillary attraction, 356; Boscovich's extension of the Newtonian formula, 357; Coulomb's measurements, 360; Extended by Gauss and Weber, 360; Davy and Faraday, 363; Ampère and Weber develop the astronoiuical view, 366; Weber's fundamental measurements, 368; Necessity of developing the infinitesimal methods, 373; Newtonian formula the basis of physical astronomy, 375; The Newtonian formula unique as to universality and accuracy, 377; Is it an ultimate law? 378; Laplace's opinion, 378 ; Opposition to the astronomical view of nature, 381.

[313] Elaborate claims to priority have been set up for persons to whom it is said the credit of modern discoveries should be given. I do not intend to contribute to this controversial literature, except  by a general remark, which will explain how it has come to pass that ideas and principles now recognized as useful instruments of thought and research have ony recently attained this importance, while they have frequently been the property of many ages of philosophical thought, and familiar even to the writers of antiquity. It is the scientific method, the exact statement, which was wanting, and which raises the vague guesses of the philosophical or the dreams of the poetic mind to the rank of definite canons of thought, capable of precise expression, of mathematical analysis, and of exact verification. Obscure notions of the attractive and repulsive forces of nature have floated before the minds of philosophers since the time of Empedocles, but they did not become useful to science till  Galileo and Newton took the first step to measure the intensity of those forces.  Lucretius's poem introduces to us the early speculations on the atomic constitution of matter, but the hypotheses of his school only led to real knowledge of the things of nature when Dalton, following Lavoisier and Richter, reduced this idea to definite numbers; still more so when, through the law of Avogadro and Ampère, the calculations of Joule, Clausius, and THomson, the velocities, the number, and sizes of atoms became calculable and measurable quantities....

    Heraclitus proclaimed, six hundred years before the Christian era, the theory that everything moves or flows; but not till this century was the attempt made to work out the definite hypothesis of Daniel Bernoulli, and to explain the properties of bodies, apparently at rest -- the pressure of gases, or the phenomena of elasticity -- by assuming a hidden motion of the imperceptible portions of matter. ... In every case the awakening touch has been the mathematical spirit, the attempt to count, to measure, or to calculate. What to the poet or the seer may appear to be the very death of all his poetry and all his visions -- the cold touch of the calculating mind, -- this has proved to be the spell by which knowledge has been born, by which new sciences have been created.

CHAPTER V.

THE ATOMIC VIEW OF NATURE.

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Recapitulation, 382; Atomic theory, 385; Lavoisier, 386; Phlogistic theory, 388; Theory of combustion, 389; Rule of fixed proportions, 392; J. Benjamin Richter, 393; Dalton, 394; Berzelius, 396; Atomic theory and gravitation compared, 396; Wollaston's prophecy, 397; Rule of multiple proportions, 398; Equivalents, 399; "Simplex sigillum veri," 401; Prout's hypothesis, 402; Discovery of Isomerism, 405; Organic Chemistry, 407; Liebig's definition of same, 409; Type theory, 411; Uncertainty in chemical theory about middle of century, 413; Two aspects of the atomic theory, 415; A convenient symbolism, 417; Neglect of the study of affinity, 420; Kopp on chemical theory in 1873, 421; The periodic law, 422; Difference between chemical and physical reasoning, 424; The kinetic theory of gases, 425; Avogadro's hypothesis, 427; Neglect of same, 429; Development of the atomic view, 431; Pasteur's discovery of "Chirality," 431 ; Atom and molecule, 432; Joule's calculations, 434; Clausius's first memoir, 435; Internal energy of molecules, 436; The atomic theory accepted as a physical theory about 1860, 437; Clerk Maxwell: The statistical view of nature, 438; Doctrine of averages, 440; Geometrical arrangement of atoms, 441; Crystallography, 441; Analogy between crystallographic and atomic laws, 444; Isomorphism, 444; Polymorphism, 446; Structural and stereo-chemistry, 447; Valency, 447; Atomic linkage, 449; The carbon tetrahedron, 450; Defects and insufficiency of the atomic view, 451; Theories of chemical affinity, 452; Practical influences, 453; Change in definition of organic chemistry, 454; Criticisms of the atomic view, 455.

[436] The atomic theory, known to the ancients, revived by Dalton in the early years of the century, and employed by chemical philosophers for half a century as a convenient symbolism, had, about the year 1860, been accepted by physicists, and used not merely as a convenient symbolism, but as a physical reality.