A HISTORY
OF
EUROPEAN THOUGHT
IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
BY
JOHN THEODORE MERZ
In Four Volumes
1907-1914
VOLUME I
William Blackwood and Sons
Edinburgh and London.
This electronic edition prepared by Dr.
David C. Bossard
from original documents in his personal library.
August, 2006.
Copyright © 2006 by David C. Bossard.
CONTENTS.
PREFACE v
vi
vii
I. Thought, the hidden world, 1; The only moving principle, 2; History
of Nature, how to be understood, 2; Not intelligible without intellect,
2; History of savage tribes, what is it? 3; Two ways in which thought
enters into history, 4; Definition of thought impossible, 4; Relation
of outer and inner worlds undefined, 5; Many meanings of thought, 5;
Thought of the present. age, 6; Contemporary history, to what extent
possible and valuable, 6; Supposed objectivity of historians, 7; Value
of contemporary records, 8; Mystery of the life of thought, 8; Latent
thought the material for genius, 8; Contemporary record of thought more
faithful, 10; Events of the immediate past, 10; Changes of language,
11; Coining of new words, 12; Object of this work, 13; Not a political
history, nor a history of science, literature, and art, 13; Influences
which have a result on our inner life, 14; Personal knowledge
necessary, 14; American influence only touched upon, 14; Only French,
German, and English thought treated, 15; Unity of thought, a product of
this century, 16; Voltaire, 16; Adam Smith, 16; Coleridge and
Wordsworth, 17; Mme. de Staël, 17; Paris the focus of science, 17;
Babbage, Herschel, and Peacock, 18; Liebig's laboratory, 18; Comte's
philosophy, 18; Constable's influence in France, 19; Science become
international, 19; The light which etymology throws on the history of
thought, 20; Goethe, 22; Peculiarity of the German language, 22; New
thought has found new words, 23; De BonaId and Max. Müller, 23;
Thought, how expressed in French and German, 24; Philosophy of history,
25; Want of precise terms in German and French, 26; Carlyle, 26.
[014] I feel obliged to limit myself to
European Thought. Such a limitation would hardly have been called for a
century ago, because it would have been a matter of course; but the
steady growth and peculiar civilization of a new and vigorous people on
the other side of the Atlantic force frome me the twofold confession,
that there is a large world of growing importance of which I have no
personal knowledge, and to estimate which I therefore feel unqualified
and unprepared; and further, that I am equally unable to picture to
myself the aspect which the whole of our European culture in its
present state may assume to an outside and far-removed observer who is
placed in the New World. As this New World grows not only in numbers
and national wealth, but also in mental depth, as it becomes more and
more intellectualised and spiritualised, so it will no doubt experience
the desire of recording its own inner life and culture... but the
tendencies of thisnew culture are to me vague and enigmatical, and I
frankly admit that I am unable to say anything definit on this subject.
[015] The subject before us is European Thought -- i.e. the fhought of
France, Germany, and England -- during the greater part of the
nineteenth century.
IL The two factors of intellectual progress, 27; Object of the book,
28; Nineteenth century, what it has achieved: (a) Method of knowledge;
(6) Unity of knowledge, 29; Search after truth, 29; Method of science,
practised by Galileo, &c., defined by Bacon, &c., 30;
Disintegration of learning, 30; Apparent distance between science and
poetry, 31; Closer connection between science and life, 31; What has
nineteenth century done for the ideals? 32; Deeper conception of the
unity of human interests, 33; Different terms for expressing this
unity, 33; Definition of thought, 33; Age of encyclopedic treatment of
learning, 34; Unity of knowledge gradually lost sight of, 35; Lectures
on "Encyclopädie" in Germany, 37; Encyclopaedias did not fulfil
their
promise, 39; French were masters in science in beginning of the
century, 41; Reaction in Germany against metaphysics, 43; Reform in
school literature, 44; Germany has taken the lead in studying the life
of thought, 46; Transition from metaphysical to historical method, 47;
Herbert Spencer, 48; Lotze, 48; Herder's 'Ideen,' 50; Humboldt's
'Kosmos,' 51 ; Lotze's 'Microcosmus,' 52; What the mental life of
mankind consists of, 55; Methods have their day and cease to be, 56.
[030] In the place of the high-sounding
but indefinable search after truth, modern science has put an elaborate
method of inquiry: this method has to be learnt by patient practice,
and not by listening to a description of it. It is laid down in the
works of those modern heroes of science, from Galileo and Newton
onward, who have practised it successfully, and from those writings
philosophers from Bacon to Comte and Mill have -- not without
misunderstanding and error -- tried to extract the rationale.
[049] Both Mr. Herbert Spencer's 'System' and [Rudolph
Hermann - ed.] Lotze's 'Microcosmus' are written with the object of
establishing the unity of thought, of preserving the conviction that
things exist and that events happen in some intelligible connection,
and especially that the religious and the scientific views of the world
and life are reconcilable. ... The other great work was that of
A. v. Humboldt [footnote: 'Kosmos'], who in the course of a long
career, peculiarly favoured by opportunities for studying Nature on an
extensive scale, and for appreciating the detail of modern reserach, of
which he was an illustrious representative, had never lost sight of the
all-pervading unity.
III. Necessity of choosing a road, 57; No central event in our age, 68;
Is history of thought history of philosophy? 60; Goethe's work involves
the deepest thought of the century, 61; Philosophy retrospective, 62;
Two questions, 63; Speculation, 64; Philosophy defined, 65; Division of
the book, 65; Neither science nor philosophy exhausts "thought," 66;
Thought also hidden in literature and art, 66; Goethe's and
Wordsworth's influence, 67; Unmethodical thought, 68; Summed up in term
"religious thought," 69; Science is exact, 69; Subjective interests,
70; Philosophy intermediate between exact science and religion, 71;
Threefold aspect of thought: scientific, philosophical, individual, 72;
Difficult to separate the three aspects, 74; French thought centred in
science, 75; State of philosophy in England, 75; Goethe's 'Faust'
representative of the thought of the century, 76; A period of ferment,
76 ; Caused by the Revolution, 77; Thought of century partly radical,
partly reactionary, 77; Byronic school, 78; Revolutionary theories, 79;
Thought to be considered as a constructive power, 80; Darwin, Spencer,
and Lotze, 81; Romanticism, 82; Scientific thought to be dealt with
first, 84; Hegel's doctrine, 85.
PART I. -- SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT.
Three
chapters on the growth and the diffusion of the scientific spirit
in the first half of the nineteenth century.
CHAPTER
I.
THE SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT IN FRANCE.
Our century the scientific century, 89; Difference of English and
Continental notions of science, 91; Relation of science and life, 92;
Foreseen by Bacon, 93; Defect in Bacon's Philosophy, 94; Corrected by
Newton, 95; Bacon's and Newton's ideas taken up by French philosophers:
Bacon and Newton compared, 96; Laplace's work, 97; French Academy of
Sciences, 99; Continental methods in mathematics, 100; Modern
analytical methods, 102; Older synthetical methods, 103; Influence of
science on French literature, 104; Absence of this influence in England
and Germany, 106; Schools of science in Paris, 106; Promoted by
Governments of Revolution, 108; Condorcet, 110; Lakanal, 111;
École normale, École polytechnique, 112; Monge's
'Descriptive Geometry,' 114; Science of Chemistry, 114; New
mathematical sciences, 116; Crystallography, 116; Theory of
probability, 118; Laplace gained his results by disregarding
"individuality," 124; The centre of interest in the sciences of life,
125; Into this centre Cuvier carried exact research, 128; Cuvier's
training, 133; Cuvier the greatest representative of the Academic
system, 136; Science during the Revolution and First Empire, 138;
Popular. isation of science in France, 142; Literary and national
popularisation, 142; Dangers of the former, 143; The Revolution added
the practical popularisation, 145; Influence of the first Napoleon on
science, 149; Napoleon favoured the mathematical sciences, 151;
Discountenanced contemporary philosophy, 152; Used statistical methods,
153; Prominence given deservedly to French names by Cuvier, 155.
[91] The great inventions of the
sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries were made without
special scientific knowledge, and frequently by persons who possessed
skill rather than learning.
[122] Laplace [an inventor, with Newton, of calculus, the science of
infinitesimals - ed], like so many other men of science, had been
called by the Emperor [Napoleon] to assist in the labours of
administration, but, according to his judgment, proved himself a poor
administrator, being unable to grasp practical issues, and always
descending into infinitesimals. It is hardly to be doubted now, after
the lapse of a century, that the infinitesimals of Laplace play a more
important par4t in problems of administration and government than the
ideas of Napoleon.
[138 - Cuvier on the effects of the French Revolution]. "There is
always a revolution required in order to change habits which have
become general... The events which disturbed the world, and which for
natural science temporarily dried up the sources of its riches, obliged
it to return to itself, and to make a new study of what it possessed,
more fruitful than the most fortunate departures could have been.
During this apparent rest, all the different parts of method were
deepened; the interior of natural objects was studied; even minerals
were dissected and reduced to their mechanical elements; a still more
intimate analysis was made by a perfected chemistry; the earth itself
was, during this interval, if the expression is allowable, dissected by
the geologists; its depts were sounded; the order and layers of rock
which formed its shell were recognized... The botanists did not gather
so many plants in their collections, but with the lens in hand they
demonstrated more and more intimate structure of the fruit, the seed,
the various relations which connect the parts of the flower... The most
delicate forms of organic tissues were exhibited; medicine and
chemistry united their efforts to appreciate in the minutest detail the
action of external elements on the living organism. ... The old natural
history had ceased to rule. It was not that old natural history any
more, but a science full of life and youth, armed with quite novel ways
and means, which beheld the world reopened by the Peace [at the
conclusion of the Napoleonic wars - footnote]."
[141 - Cuvier on the effect of the suppression caused by the French
revolution] The Convention had destroyed academies, colleges,
universities; nobody would have dared to ask boldly for their
restitution; but soon the effects of their suppression showed
themselves in the most susceptible point; the armies were without
doctors and surgeons, and these could not be created without schools.
But who would believe that time was required to give courage enough to
call them schools of medicine. Doctor and surgeon were titles too
contrary to equality, apparently because there is no authority over the
patient more necessary than that of the doctor; therefore the odd term
'schools of health' was used, and there was no question of either
examination or diploma for the students."
[145 - on positive effects of the revolution]. The fundamental notions
of a mechanical science... were expanded into a system of materialistic
philosophy in 'L'Homme Machine,' the 'Système de la Nature,' and
other works, the extreme views of which the great scientific thinkers
could hardly approve of. Much of the good done by Fontenelle, by
Voltaire, by Buffon, was spoiled or neutralised by premature and
ill-founded theories. How much, or how little, they contributed to
bring about the Revolution is a matter of much controversy; certain it
is that the Revolution broke their sway, and destroyed their immediate
influence. To the purely literary the Revolution added something
different -- viz., the modern
practical popularisation of science: it establiehed its educational and
its technical importance. Science was to be not an elegant amusement,
or a refined luxury, nor even exclusively the serious occupation of the
rare genius: it was to be the basis of a national instruction, and the
foundation of the greatness and wealth of the nation. The Memoirs of
the Academy were cleansed of all dangerous generalizations which might
have brought them into touch with political controversy; the language
was confined to the measured and concise statement of facts, or to
theories capable of mathematical verification and treatment;
conjectural matter was carefully excluded, and a standard of scientific
excellence, both in matter and form, was raised, to which we still look
up with admiration. ... If now we continually appeal to scientific
authorities for aid in the solution of practical problems, it is well
to remember that nothing helped more to raise science to the eminence
of a great social power than the action of the Revolutionary Government
in 1793. Whilst it guillotined Lavoisier, Bailly, and Cousin; drove
Dondorcet to suicide, and others lile Vicq-d'Azyr [footnote: the great
forerunner of Cuvier in the new science of comparative anatomy] and
Dionis du Séjour into premature death; it had to appeal for its
most necessary requirements to the society of scientific authorities,
which it professed not to need. ... In the space of a few years science
had become a necessity to society at large.
[152 - on Napoleon] I cannot but recognise that he was, amongst the
great heroes and statesmen of his age, the first and foremost, if not
the only one, who seemed thoroughly to realise the part which science
was destined to play in the immediate future. ... In the first decades
of this century [19th] the home of the scientific spirit was France.
CHAPTER
II.
THE SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT IN GERMANY.
Foundation of German universities, 158; Development of the universities
by the people, 159; Geographical distribution of the universities, 162;
Full development of the German university system, 163; Philosophical
faculty, 164; University of Göttingeu, 164; Relation of
universities and high schools, 166; The university a training-school
for research, 167;
The ideal of Wissenschaft,
168; Developed under the German university
system, 170; Reception of exact science in Germany, 174; Science not
yet domiciled during the eighteenth century, 178; Scientific
periodicals, 180; Gauss's mathematical researches, 181; Scientific
spirit enters the universities in second quarter of century, 183;
Jacobi's mathematical school, 185; Chemical laboratories established in
1826 through Liebig, 188; Cosmopolitan character of German science,
189; Liebig's organic analysis, 191; Biology a German science, 193;
Cellular theory of Schleiden, 194; and Schwann, 195; Ernst Heinrich
Weber, 196; and Johannes Müller, 197; Psychophysics, 198; Spirit
of
exact research and Wisscnsckaft,
202; Encyclopdic view necessary in
philosophy and history, 203; Philosophy of Nature, 204; Conflict
between the scientific and the philosophical views, 205; A. von
Humboldt, 206; Influence of Berzeiius on German science, 208;
Philosophy of Nature and medical science, 209; Science for its own
sake, 211; Bequest of the classical and philosophical school, 211;
Completeness and thoroughness of research, 213; Combination of research
and teaching, 214; Combination of science and philosophy, 215; Biology
grown out of science and philosophy combined, 216; Du Bois-Reymoud on
Müller, 217; "Vital force" abandoned, 218; Mechanical view in
biology,
219; Criticism of principles of mathematics, 221; The exact, the
historical, and the critical habits of thought, 222.
CHAPTER
III.
THE SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT IN ENGLAND.
Scientific organisation abroad, 226; Similar institutions in Great
Britain, 227; English science in the early part of the century, 229;
Alleged decline of science in England, 230; Criticisms of Playfair,
231; Babbage's criticisms, 233; Foreign opinions on English science,
235; English replies to Babbage, 238; Foundation of the British
Association, 238; Characteristics of higher mental work in England,
239; Academies and universities not always impartial, 240; Fourier, 241
; Fresnel, 241 ; Plücker, 242; Grassmann, 243; Central
organisation
wanting in England, 243; Thomas Young, 244; Dalton, 245; Faraday, 246;
Green, 246; Boole, 247; Babbage, 248; Characteristics of English
thought, 249 ; Absence of schools of scientific thought, 250;
Individual character and practical tendency of English science, 251 ;
English peculiarities more pronounced during earlier part of the
century, 252; Unique character of English universities, 254; Ideal of
"liberal education," 255; Union of education and instruction, 258;
Educational orgaulsations in England, 262; The Royal Institution, 264;
Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society,
265; John Dawson of Sedbergh, 267; The Scotch Universities, 267; The
Royal Society of Edinburgh, 269; The 'Edinburgh Review,' 270; The
Analytical Society of Cambridge, 271 ; University life in Scotland,
271; The Dublin Mathematical School, 274; Importance of British
contributions to science, 276; Diffusion of scientific knowledge on the
Continent, 276; Isolation of English men of science, 277; Individualism
of the English character, 279; Changes during the last fifty years,
280; British contributions to biology, 282; Jenner, 284; English love
of nature, 284; Union of individualism and naturalism in England, 286;
White of Selborne, 288; The Geological Society, 290; William Smith,
291;
Charles Bell, 292; Historical Geography, 294; Martin William Leake,
296; Work of the three nations compared, 298.
[251] English societies may sometimes
honour and admire, but they do not support, their great
representatives, and these themselves often refuse to be tied by
exclusive academic duties, still more by official restrictions. Two
characteristics have marked most of them: they have, at all expense and
sacrifice, guarded their individual freedom of thought, and they have
almost always shown a great desire to combine some application with
their abstract researches, to take part in the great practical work of
the nation. Continental thinkers, whose lives are devoted to the
realisation of some great ideal, complain of the want of method, of the
erratic absence of discipline, which is peculiar to English genius.
[276] There is something casual and accidental about the great ideas
which British men of science contributed during the first half of the
century. each of them chooses an isolated position, a special form of
delivery, frequently a language and style of his own. They attach
little or no importance to the labours of others, with which they are
frequently unacquainted. Important papers are lost or buried, as in the
case of cavendish and Green. Novel ideas are communicated in
unintelligible language and symbols, and accordingly neglected. This
was the case with Dr. Young's writings, and to a certain extent with
Faraday's. The greatest discoveries were unduly postponed through the
absence of assistance, as seems to have been the case with Adam's
discovery of Neptune, perhaps with Stoke's anticipation of spectrum
analysis. What might not these great minds have accomplished had they
attached the same importance to style and form as most of the great
French men of science, or had they been called upon to teach a number
of eager pupils, anxious, not to take honours and degrees, but to
understand and further elaborate the suggestions of their masters, as
has been the custom and tradition in Germany?
[290 on the formation of the Geological Society in 1807] At that time
the war of the Wernerians and Huttonians, or, as they were also called,
the Neptunists and Plutonists, was raging in the northern metropolis.
The Geological Society of London was established with a view to
"multiply and record observations, and patiently to await the result at
some future period." -- that is, its founders resolved to apply
themselves to descriptive geology, thinking the time not come for that
theoretical geology which had then long fired the controversial ardour
of Neptunists and Plutonists.
CHAPTER
IV.
THE ASTRONOMICAL VIEW OF NATURE.
The scientific spirit in the first and second half of the century, 302;
Science become international, 303; Disappearance of national
differences, 305; Special scientific ideas, 306; Philosophy of science,
306; Whewell's 'History' and 'Philosophy,' 309; Philosophy and science,
311; Leading
scientific ideas mostly very ancient, 312; Mathematical spirit, 314;
When first introduced into science, 317; Newton's 'Principia,' 318; The
gravitation formula, 319; Lines of thought emanating from it, 321;
Element of error, 323; Laplace and Newton, 328; Several interests which
promote science, 326; Insufficiency of observation, 328; Practical
interest, 328; Focalising effect of mathematical formuke, 332; Matter
and force mathematically defined, 334; Weight and mass, 336;
Gravitation not an ultimate property of matter, 338; Attraction and
repulsion, 342; Electrical and magnetic action, 344; Law of emanations,
344; Molecular action, 346; The astronomical view: Cosmical, molar, and
molecular phenomena, 348; Special interest attached to molar
dimensions, 350; Geometrical axioms, 352; Difficulty of measuring
gravitation directly, 353; Astronomical view of molecular phenomena,
354; Capillary attraction, 356; Boscovich's extension of the Newtonian
formula, 357; Coulomb's measurements, 360; Extended by Gauss and Weber,
360; Davy and Faraday, 363; Ampère and Weber develop the
astronoiuical
view, 366; Weber's fundamental measurements, 368; Necessity of
developing the infinitesimal methods, 373; Newtonian formula the basis
of physical astronomy, 375; The Newtonian formula unique as to
universality and accuracy, 377; Is it an ultimate law? 378; Laplace's
opinion, 378 ; Opposition to the astronomical view of nature, 381.
[313] Elaborate claims to priority have
been set up for persons to whom it is said the credit of modern
discoveries should be given. I do not intend to contribute to this
controversial literature, except by a general remark, which will
explain how it has come to pass that ideas and principles now
recognized as useful instruments of thought and research have ony
recently attained this importance, while they have frequently been the
property of many ages of philosophical thought, and familiar even to
the writers of antiquity. It is the scientific method, the exact
statement, which was wanting, and which raises the vague guesses of the
philosophical or the dreams of the poetic mind to the rank of definite
canons of thought, capable of precise expression, of mathematical
analysis, and of exact verification. Obscure notions of the attractive
and repulsive forces of nature have floated before the minds of
philosophers since the time of Empedocles, but they did not become
useful to science till Galileo and Newton took the first step to
measure the intensity of those forces. Lucretius's poem
introduces to us the early speculations on the atomic constitution of
matter, but the hypotheses of his school only led to real knowledge of
the things of nature when Dalton, following Lavoisier and Richter,
reduced this idea to definite numbers; still more so when, through the
law of Avogadro and Ampère, the calculations of Joule, Clausius,
and THomson, the velocities, the number, and sizes of atoms became
calculable and measurable quantities....
Heraclitus proclaimed, six hundred years before the
Christian era, the theory that everything moves or flows; but not till
this century was the attempt made to work out the definite hypothesis
of Daniel Bernoulli, and to explain the properties of bodies,
apparently at rest -- the pressure of gases, or the phenomena of
elasticity -- by assuming a hidden motion of the imperceptible portions
of matter. ... In every case the awakening touch has been the
mathematical spirit, the attempt to count, to measure, or to calculate.
What to the poet or the seer may appear to be the very death of all his
poetry and all his visions -- the cold touch of the calculating mind,
-- this has proved to be the spell by which knowledge has been born, by
which new sciences have been created.
CHAPTER
V.
THE ATOMIC VIEW OF NATURE.
Recapitulation, 382; Atomic theory, 385; Lavoisier, 386; Phlogistic
theory, 388; Theory of combustion, 389; Rule of fixed proportions, 392;
J. Benjamin Richter, 393; Dalton, 394; Berzelius, 396; Atomic theory
and gravitation compared, 396; Wollaston's prophecy, 397; Rule of
multiple proportions, 398; Equivalents, 399; "Simplex sigillum veri,"
401; Prout's hypothesis, 402; Discovery of Isomerism, 405; Organic
Chemistry, 407; Liebig's definition of same, 409; Type theory, 411;
Uncertainty in chemical theory about middle of century, 413; Two
aspects of the atomic theory, 415; A convenient symbolism, 417; Neglect
of the study of affinity, 420; Kopp on chemical theory in 1873, 421;
The periodic law, 422; Difference between chemical and physical
reasoning, 424; The kinetic theory of gases, 425; Avogadro's
hypothesis, 427; Neglect of same, 429; Development of the atomic view,
431; Pasteur's discovery of "Chirality," 431 ; Atom and molecule, 432;
Joule's calculations, 434; Clausius's first memoir, 435; Internal
energy of molecules, 436; The atomic theory accepted as a physical
theory about 1860, 437; Clerk Maxwell: The statistical view of nature,
438; Doctrine of averages, 440; Geometrical arrangement of atoms, 441;
Crystallography, 441; Analogy between crystallographic and atomic laws,
444; Isomorphism, 444; Polymorphism, 446; Structural and
stereo-chemistry, 447; Valency, 447; Atomic linkage, 449; The carbon
tetrahedron, 450; Defects and insufficiency of the atomic view, 451;
Theories of chemical affinity, 452; Practical influences, 453; Change
in definition of organic chemistry, 454; Criticisms of the atomic view,
455.
[436] The atomic theory, known to the
ancients, revived by Dalton in the early years of the century, and
employed by chemical philosophers for half a century as a convenient
symbolism, had, about the year 1860, been accepted by physicists, and
used not merely as a convenient symbolism, but as a physical reality.