A HISTORY
OF
EUROPEAN THOUGHT
IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
BY
JOHN THEODORE MERZ
In Four Volumes
1907-1914
VOLUME III
William Blackwood and Sons
Edinburgh and London.
This electronic edition prepared by Dr.
David C. Bossard
from original documents in his personal library.
August, 2006.
Copyright © 2006 by David C. Bossard.
CONTENTS.
PREFACE v
vi
Common-sense and speculation, 3; Language the instrument of
commonsense, 3; New terms in philosophy, 4; Creative and critical eras,
6; Contrast between philosophical and scientific thought, 8; Seen
especially in language, 10; The precept of science and that of
philosophy, 12; External object common to all; internal, peculiar to
the observing subject, 13; Outer world in space; inner world in time,
13; Distinction, however, not hard and fast, 15; Either language or
bodily sensation can furnish a point of union, 15; Psycho-physical view
of nature, 17; Kantian Idealism the antithesis to this, 18; Both
methods overreach their limit, 19; Their permanent value, 19;
Transition to the social point of view, 20; A characteristic tendency
of recent thought, 21; Biology and the history of origins, 22; Reality
added by thought to natural things, 24; Twofold aspect of the Real
first recognised by Plato, 25; Medieval philosophy and the modern break
with it, 27; Community between Kant and Plato, 28; Evolution and the
power of words, 30; The social point of view in history, 31;
Application to the history of thought, 33; Differences as well as
uniting ideas not to be neglected, 34; New point of view required, 34;
Contrast to be dealt with, 34; Philosophical contrasted with scientific
method, 85; Histories of philosophy, 37; Kuno Fischer, 39; National and
international work in science and philosophy, 41 ; Auguste Comte, 43;
English empiricism, 43; Social point of view in France and England, 43;
Absence of the same in Germany, 44; Psychological, metaphysical, and
positive interests, 45; A new character of philosophical thought in the
century, 47; The term Criticism as used by Kant, 48; Criticism and
history, 49; Growth and diffusion of the critical spirit, 50; Hegel and
Spencer, 51; Intermediate
position of philosophy between science and religion, 52; Monistic
doctrines, 52,; Attempts at reconciliation of knowledge and belief, 54;
Dualism in philosophic systems, 55; Plan of this history, 56; Character
and aims of philosophical thought, 59; No consensus as to philosophical
methods, 60; Philosophy is interested, science disinterested, 62;
Philosophers as educators and reformers, 64; Problems of science are
many, problem of philosophy is one, 65; Renunciation in recent
philosophy, 66; Reversion to common-sense, 68 ; "Scientific
Philosophy," 69 ; Direction of Herbart and Lotze, 71; E. Zeller, 71 ;
Wilhelm Wundt, 72 ; Influence of Schopenhauer, 74; Materialism of the
"Forties," 76; Schopenhauer's pessimism an accident, 77; Realism of
Nietzsche, 78; Comte's sociology, 80; Temporary decline of philosophic
interest, 81; Hints of its revival, 82; "Voluntarism," 83; Relation of
recent philosophy to religion, 87.
[077] The philosphy of Schopenhauer
came to many younger minds as a kind of revelation. It was sufficiently
speculative to satisfy the idealistic craving; it summed up its
teaching in an intelligible formula; it supported its doctrines by a
great wealth of artistic insight; and it contrasted favourably with the
writings of Hegel by the elegance and lucidity of its literary style.
Add to this, that it was highly spiced by brilliant and unsparing
invective against the philosophers who had so long, by unfilfilled
promises, led the nation astray; it was also the first attempt in
Germany to drop, in the discussion of the highest problems, the
professorial and academic tone, which to many practically minded people
had assumed too much self-assurance and the pride of infallibility.
Unfortunately the theoretical principles of Schopenhauer's philosophy
were, in their practical application to ethical problems, joined to a
pessimistic view of the world and life. ...It was opposed to the spirit
of Plato, which likewise influenced Schopenhauer, and it stands in no
logical connection with his abstract principles. Allied as it was to
that sensation of world-sickness which ran through a large portion of
Continental literature, it appealed to many youthful and ardent spirits
who found the ideals of a former generation destroyed and its hopes
abandoned.
[085] There is no mistaking the signs of the times; the tide is running
away from abstract dogmas and metaphysical speculation. Both these have
been tried and found wanting, so far as the great practical problems
are concerned. Theology has failed to evangelise the masses, and
philosophy to enlighten them. For a time all hopes were concentrated
upon exact science, but this also has shown itself powerless to deal
with fundamental questions, or to approach the ground and origin of
things. Truth, in the higher sense of the word, as an expression of the
truly Real, is no longer an object of scientific research. Exact
science does not profess to deal with essences ad existences, but only
with what is apparent.
CHAPTER
II.
ON THE GROWTH AND DIFFUSION OF
THE CRITICAL SPIRIT.
Reversal of the position of science and philosophy, 91; Causes of the
change, 93; Anarchy of recent philosophy, 93 ; Critical spirit, 95;
Narrower and wider sense of criticism, 96; Germany the home of
criticism in the wider sense, 98 ; Attempts to apply exact methods to
philosophy, 100; Reason of their failure, 101; Contrast between unities
to which phenomena of nature and inner life are referred, 103; Loss of
synoptic view in recent philosophy, 104 ; Sapping effect of critical
spirit, 105; How has science escaped 106; The escape has not been
complete, 106; Reasons why science has not succumbed, 107; Peculiar
strength in their
practical utility, 109; Besides, man cannot judge nature, 109;
Criticism a reflection of the mind on itself, 110; Three critical
periods, 110; From the last we have not yet emerged, 111; its
methodical character, 112;
Obstructions to it, 113; Winckelmann's reform of art by criticism,
114l; Ideal of humanity: its phases, 115 ; Lessing's revival of
Spinoza, 118 Kant and Spinoza the poles of German thought, 119; Spinoza
and German idealism, 121 ; Spinoza, Lessiug, Kant, and the Higher
Criticism, 123; Representative higher critics, 127; Göttingen and
the
critical spirit, 127; Criticism an instrument of education, 130 ;
Difference of philosophical and historical criticism, 131 ; Two modes
of treatment. in classical philology, 134 ; Criticism as practised by
Hermann and Ritschl, 137; Encyclopaedic aims of F. A. Wolf, 138 ;
Sprach-philologen and Sach-philologen, 139; Ritschl and Liebig
compared, 145; Extension of methods from classical to other branches of
philology, 146; Bopp and Grimm, 147; Extension to historical studies,
148; Broader view of
history since Niebuhr, 150; Leopold von Ranke, 151; Ernst Curtius, 152;
Theod. Mommsen, 156; Political temper in Mommsen, 158; Liberation of
historical criticism from religious influence, 159; First application
of criticism to religion by Fichte and Kant, 161; Schieiermacher's
Religious Discourses, 162; Criticism of religious origins, 163;
Eichhorn as successor of Astruc, 164; Influence of Hegel, 166; David F.
Strauss, 166; F. C. Baur, 170; Philosophical criticism: Feuerbach, 174;
Humanistic interpretation of Hegel, 174; Another interpretation, 174;
Materialistic controversy, 176; Renunciation of premature solutions:
Lotze, 178; Return from metaphysics to psychology: Herbart, 179;
Fechner's psycho-physics, 179; Neo-Kantism: F. A. Lange, 179; Influence
of Darwin and Riemann, 180; Unsettlement due to criticism, 182;
Philosophical thought outside Germany, 183 ; French and English
philosophy little known in Germany, 183; French and English philosophy
uncritical in the German sense, 184; The philosophy of Renouvier, 185 ;
Recent critical tendency in England, 186; Cousin's Eclecticism and
philosophy of Common-sense, 186; Philosophy becoming international,
187; Criticism the common meeting-ground, 188.
CHAPTER
III.
OF THE SOUL.
Philosophical and scientific thought again contrasted, 192; Aim at
unification, 193; General conceptions ancient and modern, 194; Words
marking leading philosophical problems, 195; The problem of the Soul or
Psychology, 196; The 'Seelenfrage,' 197 ; Problems centering in this,
200; Empirical and rational psychology, 200; At the beginning of the
century rational psychology mainly studied in Germany, 202; Empirical
psychology chiefly British, 202; French physiological psychology, 203;
Herbart, 204; Conceptions introduced by Herbart, 207; Exact method,
208; Beneke, 208; British introspective psychology, 209; Attempt to
base psychology on elementary scientific principles, 211 ; Errors of
this procedure, 212 ; Association psychology, 215 ; James Mill's mental
chemistry, 218; Alex. Bain, 218; Want of system in British philosophy,
219; University teaching in Scotland, 221; Philosophy of commonsense,
24 ; British ideas carried over to France, 227; Reaction and
development, 230; De Tracy and the idea of activity, 231; Maine de
Biran, 232; Royer Collard and Cousin, 235; Influence of Kant and of
German idealism, 236; Kant and psychology, 237; Epistemological
development in Germany, 243; Kant's psychological programme, 248; The
way out of individualism, 248; General causes of this movement,
250; Disappearance of psychology in the older sense, 252; Individual
self merged into general self, 255 ; Creation of ideals, 256; The
educational movement, 256; The political movement, 257 ; Return to
empirical psychology, 258; J, F. Fries, 258; Influence of physiology,
259; Feuerbach on Hegel, 260; Die Seelenfrage, 261; International
contact, 262; Lotze, 264; Approaches philosophy from the side of
medicine, 265; Connection with the classical period, 265; His
psychology, 266; His circumspection, 267; Various lines in recent
psychology, 268; Ribot, 269; Morbid psychology, 272; 'Mind' and Croom
Robertson, 275;
James Ward, 277 ; Avenarius, 282; Hartmann, Spencer, and
Fouillée, 285; Spencer's evolutional psychology, 286; Idealistic
antecedents of Hartmann and Fouillée, 286; The Unconscious in
psychology, 287; Change in vocabulary, 289; Stress laid on activity and
feeling, 290; Presentation-continuum, 291; Anthropology, 291;
Discontinuity -- Renouvier, 291.
CHAPTER
IV.
OF KNOWLEDGE.
Early appearance of the problem of knowledge, 294; Re-emergence
characteristic of nineteenth century, 294 ; Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, 295; Erkenntnisstheorie, 296;
Renouvier's Neocriticism, 296;
Agnosticism and Pragmatism, 297; Preparation in login and psychology,
298; Influence of current literature and science, 299; Effect of the
French Revolution, 300; Later dominance of exact science, 800; J. S.
Mill, 301; Influence of social questions, 302; Influence of mathematics
in France, 302; Reaction in British thought, 304; Dispersive character
of earlier British thought, 309; Its want of systematic unity, 311;
Beginning of search for a creed, 312; The first episode ends in
Agnosticism, 315 Continental efforts to transcend dualism, 316; Two
lines of
development, 317; Union of these, 317 ; Continental thought began with
scepticism, 320; Descartes' constructive effort, 321 ; Mathematical
methods, 322; Spiuoza and Leibniz, 324; Diverging directions after
Leibniz, 330; Aim at unity in Continental thought, 331; Spinoza and
Leibniz contrasted, 331; Leibniz and Bayle, 332; Systematisation of
Leibniz's ideas, 335; New way opened by Kant, 336; Relation to Locke,
Hume, and Leibniz, 339; Locke and Kant, 340; Kaut,'s philosophy a
central point, 344; Relativity of Knowledge, 344; The sensible and the
intelligible, 345; The regulative ideas, 346; Acceptance of extant body
of scientific knowledge, 348; And of traditional psychology, 349;
Apparent want of unity, 349; Criticism predominant, 350; Reinhold, 351
; Criticism superseded by construction, 355; Fichte, 357; Fichte
representative of a new generation, 363; Schelling, 366; Want of
criticism and exactness, 367; Hegel aims at supplying the want, 371; J.
S. Mill's Logic, 374; Ground common to Mill and Kant, 377; Sir W.
Hamilton, 379; A. Comte, 381; Revival and deepening of the historical
sciences, 386; Epistemology and exact sciences, 390; Greater precision,
391; Conception of energy, 392; Darwin and development, 394; Cause and
effect defined, 397; Supersession of astronomical view, 400; Plenum
substituted, 400; Limitation of scientific knowledge, 403; Dualism in
the problem of knowledge, 406 ; Recognised by Lotze, 406; His doctrine
of Values, 408; Hegel's new conception of Logic, 410; Reaction against
this, 411; Lotze and English Hegelianism, 412; Bradley and Bosanquet,
414; Lotze and Spencer, 415; The 'Unknowable,' 416; Renouvier on
Discontinuity and Personality, 417; Schopenhauer's Voluntarism, 418;
Overthrow of extreme Intellectualism, 419.
CHAPTER
V.
OF REALITY.
Epistemology and systems of philosophy, 421 ; Some systems start with
theories of Reality, 423 ; Interests of academic teaching and of
practical life, 424; Discredit of Metaphysics, 428; Revival of
Metaphysics, 430; Necessity of the word, 431 ; The problem of Reality,
432; Modern problem of Reality centres in Kant, 435; The "Thing in
itself," 437; His objection to Idealism, 439 ; His "Categorical
Imperative," 441 ; Importance of his terminology, 441; Fichte on Kant's
terms for Reality, 442; Fichte and Schelling, 445 ; "Intellectual
Intuition," 445; Fichte's practical aims, 447 ; "Self-realisation,"
448 ; Fiehte's Absolute is a process, 450; Schelling, 453: His central
position in German Idealism, 453; Practical and poetical interests,
456; Rehabilitation of Nature, 458; Formulae of "polarity," 461 ;
Hegel,
464; Philosophy of the Absolute Spirit, 466 ; Logical process
identified with world-process, 469; Reason of Hegel's success, 471 ;
Compared with Bacon, 476; Meaning of the identification of the Rational
and the Real, 478; Opposition to the monistic tendency, 479; Herbart,
481; Schopenhauer, 482; The term "positive," 487 ; Schelling's positive
philosophy, 488 ; His religious turn, 489; New eclectic spirit, 491 ;
Lotze, 491 ; Defect in historical sense, 494 ; Doctrine of Values, 495;
Ethics the root of Metaphysics, 4.98 ; Detailed interest in phenomena,
501 ; At the summit a religious conception, 503; Theory of knowledge
and belief, 505; The problem of Reality since Lotze, 506; The idea of
Personality, 507; The problem of Evil, 508; Ethical problems, 509;
Ethical spirit of
British philosophy, 510; Return of British thinkers to Metaphysics,
510; Spencer's "Unknowable," 511; Wundt, 513 ; Lotze's, Spencer's, and
Wundt's phenomenalism contrasted, 516; Fechner and E. von Hartmann,
518; Return to Ontology in England and France, 523; The two movements
of search in England: Realistic and Idealistic, 527; Popular
influences: the new monthly Reviews, 530; Caird, Wallace, and Green,
532; Bradley's 'Appearance and Reality,' 533; Bradley and Lotze, 534;
Bradley's opposition to both atomistic and transcendental view of
Reality, 536 ; His Monism or Absolutism, 540; Phenomenalists and
Ontologists, 542.
CHAPTER
VI.
OF NATURE.
Nature: a metaphysical problem, 544; Superseded by empirical studies,
545 ; Changes in the thoughts of the age, 546; The exact study of
Nature, 547 ; Naturalism of English poetry and art, 547; Philosophy of
Nature, 547; Importance of this last, 549; Laplace, 550; Absence of
organic and subjective factors, 552; Biological appeal of Schelling,
553 ; An omitted idea: Malthus, 554; Afterwards taken up by Darwin,
554; Statical view of French science, 555; Insufficiency of this, 555 ;
Vague ideas of development kept back by mathematical spirit, 558 ; A
premature rationale in materialism, 560; Büchner, 561; Inadequacy,
yet popularity, of "Matter" and "Force," 565; Inexactness of the
popular term Force, 566; Lotze's formula regarding mechanism, 570;
Success and failure of Materialism, 570; Change in scientific
conceptions, 573; New criticism of fundamental notions, 575 ; J. S.
Mill, 575 ; Thomson and Tait, Maxwell, 576; Kirchhoff, 578; Wundt and
Mach, 578 ; Clifford and K. Pearson, 579; Economy of Thought: Mach and
Avenarius, 579; Want of philosophical interest attaching to mechanical
theories, 533; Schopenhauer's philosophical view of Nature, 536;
Opposed to Paulogism and Mechanicism, 587 ; Schopenhauer an idealist
and romantic, 589 ; As also Von Hartmann, 590; The philosophy of the
"Unconscious," 590; The ideal view displaced by the naturalistic, 593 ;
Wundt on Actuality, 595; Rise of the problem of Discontinuity, 597; Du
Bois Reymond, 597; Haeckel's Monism, 600; Loose use by naturalists of
physical concepts, 603; Mach on the limitation of mechanical physics,
604 ; Effects of modern analysis on view of nature as a whole, 606;
Artistic view of nature, 610; Goethe as representative of the synoptic
view, 611 ; This view indispensable in science also, 613; Double use of
the word
positive, 614; Fechner and Lotze, 615; Lotze's distinction between
things, forms, and values, 615; New problems, 617; The problems of the
Contingent aud the Discontinuous outstanding, 619; Lachelier and
Renouvier, 620; Transition to aesthetic and ethical aspects, 625.
INDEX i
ii
iii
iv
v
vi
vii
viii
ix
x
xi
xii
xiii
xiv
xv xvi
xvii
xviii
xix xx
