

region of the sensations alone nor that of the intellect alone afforded any room for the æsthetic faculty—*i.e.*, for the appreciation or creation of the Beautiful. He had thrown out the idea—though he had not maintained the existence—of an intuitive intellect as opposed to the discursive intellect with which human beings were endowed. This idea was taken up by some of his followers

ity. This certainly stood as a task before the mind of Schiller even before he became acquainted with Kant's original treatment. His knowledge and appreciation of Kant's writings had been confined to two tracts which Kant had written in the 'Berlin Monthly' on "the problem of the origin and historical development of the human race" (1784-1786). These had impressed him much, and convinced him, as he wrote to Körner (29th August 1787), that he would be obliged to "read and perhaps to study" Kant. The novelty in Kant's treatment may be stated to consist in the attempt to find in the human mind the exact position which the sensation, perception, and recognition of the Beautiful occupied as compared with the purely intellectual faculties on the one side and the moral on the other. It was indeed a psychological problem, but one conceived under the sway of the older faculty-psychology. The following extract taken from Schasler's History referred to above (p. 471 *sqq.*) will, I think, give my readers the clearest and most concise statement so far as it interests us in this chapter. "Kant's philosophy falls into the two divisions of the theoretical and practical philosophy—*i.e.*, into the doctrine of the subjectivity of knowledge and the doctrine of liberty: the former is treated in the 'Critique of Pure Reason,' the latter in the

'Critique of Practical Reason.' The former, subjective knowledge, forms the region of understanding, its aim being Truth; the latter, the subjective will, with its aim in the Good, is the province of reason. Kant is the first who distinguished these two, understanding and reason, as separate faculties, a distinction which has since, at least in this sense, been superseded. Between these two opposed faculties Kant interposes a third, the faculty of Judgment, in this wise that on the one side it participates in both, and on the other differs from them. It has in common with the understanding judgment; with the faculty of desire, pleasure and displeasure; but in order not to identify them, Kant adds that its judgment is without conceptions, for with these the understanding alone is occupied, and its pleasure is without interest, for this belongs only to the faculty of desire. Whilst understanding is directed towards the True, and willing towards the Good, the faculty of judgment is directed to the Beautiful, for this implies, on the one side, a judgment, *viz.*, that of approval, but without a notion of the essence of the thing; and produces, on the other side, satisfaction, but without a practical interest in it. This recognition of the Beautiful without definite conceptions is what we call Taste."