

sophers to whom I referred above, such as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, two questions presented themselves. First, the question as to the origin, in the human soul, of the distinction which we make between the Beautiful and its opposite; and, secondly, the further question: What distinguishes beautiful things from their opposite? The former was a psychological, the latter a metaphysical, question. This distinction, which deals with the psychological origin of the sensations of beauty on the one side and with the definition of beauty on the other—the subjective and the objective aspect of beauty,—runs parallel with a similar treatment of the ethical problem which also divided itself into the two questions: How does the moral judgment arise in the human soul? and, What is the criterion of goodness? In the two cases we may say that a distinction was made between the questions as to the moral or æsthetical sense possessed by human beings and the question as to the criterion of the good and the beautiful. The two discussions, that referring to the beautiful or matters of taste and that referring to the good or matters of duty and obligation, were frequently mixed up, a clear distinction between the morally and the æsthetically beautiful being overlooked or wellnigh extinguished. This led to a kind of æstheticism in morals and to moralising in matters of taste, which did much havoc, especially among many of the German writers of the ‘Aufklärung.’ It was one of Kant’s merits to have put an end to this sensualism and æstheticism in morals, and to have emphasised again the stern sense of duty not only as the foundation of morality but also as the most im-

18.
Shaftesbury
and
Hutcheson.