

archetypus is possible, but only that we, in contrast to our own discursive intellect which requires images (*intellectus ectypus*), . . . are led to the idea of an *intellectus archetypus*, and that it contains no contradiction.' It appears, indeed, as if the author here referred to a Divine intellect; but if we are to elevate ourselves in the moral region through the belief in God, Virtue, and Immortality, into a higher sphere,¹ the same might conceivably take place in the intellectual region; we might through the contemplation [sight] of an ever-creating nature become worthy to take an intellectual part in her creations. Had I not indeed unconsciously and through a hidden impulse, untiringly striven for the ground-form and the typical, even though I had succeeded in building up a natural exposition, nothing would now prevent me from courageously facing what the old man of Königsberg termed 'the adventure of reason' itself."

This is exactly what Schelling attempted to do in philosophy. He placed himself, as it were, at the root or beginning of things, and conceived of nature and mind as emanating from the same source, from a state of indifference or identity, forming the two sides of the world-process—the unconscious and the conscious. His earlier writings were accordingly concerned with tracing the different stages of this twofold development, the former in the philosophy of nature, the latter in the philosophy of mind. At the end of this he points out that what philosophy has done in detail and in elaborating an intellectual intuition must at last

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Philosophical
meaning
of Schel-
ling's
attempt.

¹ As Kant pointed out in his 'Practical Philosophy.'