

the Beautiful stands at the end of the idealistic movement of thought. It has been remarked that in this statement Lotze does not do justice to sundry developments which have equally their starting-points in suggestions which were more or less distinctly expressed in the writings of Schelling. And, as I said before, we may look upon the latter as the centre of the idealistic movement.¹ Among those developments it is of interest

¹ Lotze's theory of Beauty and the Beautiful, which he himself traces back to Schelling and Kant, has not received that attention on the part of historians which it deserves. This neglect is, I believe, largely due to the criticism to which Lotze's æsthetical writings have been submitted by Von Hartmann and by Schasler: by the latter in a lengthy Review, which he published shortly after the appearance of Lotze's 'History' in his Art Journal 'Die Dioskuren'; this he quotes in an appendix to his 'History,' and considers—as does likewise Hartmann—that it has finally disposed of Lotze's æsthetics as a popular exposition of Weisse's ideas. On the other side, Erdmann, on whose mind the importance of Lotze's ideas grew, did more justice to Lotze in proportion as he emancipated himself from the early control of the Hegelian formalism. In fact, the best and concisest rendering of Lotze's central idea is given by Erdmann, when he defines Lotze's difference from Schelling: "The defect in Schelling's system which caused the antagonism of the natural sciences has also been fatal to his Æsthetics in spite of all the credit which is here due to him. This defect lies in his misunderstanding of the difference of Ideas and Appearances: the former denote values, tasks, imperatives; the latter are governed by mechanism — i.e., by

rigid causality or necessity. Inasmuch as Schelling, instead of modestly admitting the latter, claims to have demonstrated what must be through that which ought to be, he has made natural science his enemy. But it has likewise become to him æsthetically impossible to see that the joyful surprise afforded by the Beautiful (in nature) has its ground in this, that by the entirely different processes of necessity that has come about which ought to be, and, as such, possesses value. That the manifoldness of visible things, though not subject to any moral obligation, deports itself in ideal forms, fills us with reverent enjoyment through the semblance of a world in which the eternal laws of what ought to be appear in flesh and blood" (Erdmann, 'Geschichte der Philosophie,' 3rd ed., vol. ii. p. 854). According to Lotze, without a conflict between what ought to be and what is, there could exist neither the Beautiful nor its opposite. That such a conflict is solved in the totality of actual existence is a matter of religious faith, a fundamental conviction; that in single instances and moments this conflict appears solved to us in actual life produces in us the feeling of joyful surprise, as it were an unsuspected gift of good fortune confirming our fundamental spiritual conviction or hope.