

idealistic philosophies; but he lays stress upon what he calls the concrete side of the idealistic view. According to him the Beautiful consists in the sensible appearance of the Idea. In his history of modern *Æsthetics* in Germany he accordingly divides the idealistic writers on the Beautiful into two classes. The first represent concrete idealism, the principal representative being Hegel; the second represent abstract idealism, the principal representatives being Schelling, Solger, and Weisse.¹

¹ A concise summary of his critical account will be found at the end of the first book of his '*Deutsche Aesthetik seit Kant*' (1886), pp. 357-362. This work contains—as do likewise several of Hartmann's later writings, such notably as his '*Treatise on the Categories*' and his '*Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness*'—an enormous mass of historical information, and does justice to the writings of many authors, unnoticed or forgotten, who nevertheless advanced the discussion of the subject on more or less important lines. He is unjust only when he criticises thinkers whose fundamental principles put his own entirely out of court, such, *e.g.*, as Weisse and Lotze in their distinctly theistic tendency, which he wrongly regards as mere accommodation to current but nevertheless obsolete beliefs. The constructive part of his *æsthetics* ('*Philosophie des Schönen*,' 1887), though its aim is to show the importance of his fundamental doctrine of the Unconscious in dealing with the problem of the Beautiful and of Art, contains, nevertheless, lucid chapters which may be read with advantage even by those who do not appreciate his fundamental doctrine. Such are notably the passage on "the Beautiful as Mystery" (pp. 197-199), and still

more the chapter on "Beauty and Truth" (pp. 434-444), from which I have freely quoted in the text. One more quotation is characteristic: "The word Mystery does not mean anything else but that the decisive point of the *æsthetic* process lies in the Unconscious, and the increase of the feeling for the strength and depth of this mystery is equivalent to the increasing anticipation that the essence of the beautiful lies in the unconscious perception of an immanent content unconscious in *æsthetic* appearance. Higher beauty does indeed give more matter for reflection also to discursive thought than the lower; but proportionally to the inexplicable mysterious remainder the conceptual part of the beautiful becomes smaller, the higher the beautiful stands; and—still more—the conceptual part becomes in proportion to the mysterious ever less important and, taken *æsthetically*, more indifferent. Not only does the ideal kernel of the beautiful become broader and larger, also it becomes more weighty and important, the nearer the individual idea stands to the absolute world-ground. That the increase of the mystery is at the same time an increase of the unconscious logic of the Beautiful is seen only in the highest modifications of