the narrower sense — and those which are inevitably accompanied by the feeling of obligation, namely, the ethical judgments.

From this we see that Herbart does not approve of the divisions and definitions which were introduced by Kant. Kant had employed the practical principle, which he termed the Categorical Imperative, to define for practical if not for theoretical purposes the essence of the truly Real. This had been further elaborated by Fichte, who placed the active principle at the entrance of his system. Combined with Kant's doctrine that all empirical knowledge refers only to appearance and not to the truly Real, this meant that the principle of action or the rule of practice would necessarily turn out to be a purely formal and abstract precept without any intelligible sense or meaning through which this abstract principle recommends itself to our approval. Against this Herbart maintains that the practical - i.e., the æsthetical and the ethical—has our approval not through its form but through its content, inasmuch as it contains something which is valuable in our estimation. The æsthetical view of Herbart has been stigmatised

as formal¹ in opposition to the metaphysical conception

¹ Herbart proposed to investigate both æsthetical and moral questions by a combined process of analysis and synthesis not unlike, and no doubt influenced by, similar discussions which abound in the philosophical literature of this country since the time of Shaftesbury. Considering that the epithet of the Beautiful belongs only to the relations of single sensuous elements which, in themselves, do not deserve this epithet, Herbart aimed at discovering those fundamental relations which call forth æsthetical approval, and which in their combination produce the very complex works of nature and art forming the world of the Beautiful. His æsthetics, therefore, proposed to take, what Fechner ('Vorschule der Æsthetik,' introduction) more emphatically urged, a way "from below" in contradistinction to the metaphysical way "from above."

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