

this view Herbart himself combined a distinct aversion towards that endeavour so prominent among the idealists—the endeavour, viz., to see in works of art the expression of something extraneous though higher, to reduce them to symbols of something else. Much more important than in the directions just mentioned is the influence of Herbart in two other directions, although this is not shown pre-eminently in his treatment of the æsthetical problem. I mention it here because it offers a convenient transition from the subject of this chapter to that of the following. It has been stated that Herbart's views are, to a large extent, foreshadowed in those of Kant. Nevertheless he introduced certain modifications in the expression of these views which have become important. Kant had introduced the idea of purpose in order to explain the Beautiful, which, as he put it, appears to us purposeful without having a definite end or purpose extraneous to itself. It had, in fact, its purpose within itself. This correct idea received a more adequate expression when Herbart put in the place of the term purpose or end the term value or worth. In doing so he emphasised the truth already expressed by Kant, that in pronouncing æsthetical judgments we do not reflect upon the usefulness of the thing we judge, but recognise its end or purpose to lie in itself. At the same time, this way of putting the matter points to the subjective side of æsthetical judgments, inasmuch as we can only speak of the value or worth of anything if we personally realise or experience the same. It also allows us to bring together æsthetical and ethical judg-

57.
His introduction of
the term
Value.