

as well as in ethics the idea of value is made the starting-point, we cannot get rid of the question what it is that gives value to anything, be it a natural object, a creation of art, or an act of the human Will. Kant had not made the idea of value the starting-point of his practical philosophy, though it had served him under the name of purpose to define the Beautiful. In ethics he had made the idea of obligation or duty in the form of the Categorical Imperative, the starting-point and dominating conception. Had he attempted to explain psychologically why the highest moral law meets with our approval he would have, to some extent at least, bridged over the distance which separates the good from the beautiful. This was done by that line of reasoning which begins with Herbart. Now although in the sequel very different views have been taken by different thinkers on the relation of æsthetics to ethics, or of the beautiful to the good, there is an unmistakable tendency manifested among the later philosophers of the nineteenth century to emphasise the ethical, educational, and sociological importance of art, and this has frequently happened with those thinkers who have recognised and painfully experienced the decline of the religious factor in modern civilisation. To their view art has in proportion gained in importance, the beautiful has appeared as a kind of receptacle of those truths which formerly presented themselves more naturally in the form of religious beliefs; the vanishing ideals of earlier phases of culture are to be preserved in the works of art and in the region of the beautiful. I have already pointed out how this aspect found expression in the writings of Lange, and