

of disapproval and displeasure. This correspondence or parallelism between the beautiful and the good fails, however, when we recognise that the contemplation of the good brings with it the sense of obligation, when the terms good and bad are changed into right and wrong, duty and neglect; in fact the morally beautiful does not remain merely a thing of disinterested pleasure, but becomes an obligation presenting itself in the form of duties which we have to perform. If the first question be answered, if we have arrived at a definition of what is good, or, in the highest sense, of the Good, we have only solved one half of the ethical problem; we have still to show that, and how, this highest good becomes or is to become a motive in our actions, how and why it attains a controlling power over our Will. Practical moralists, those interested mainly in the study of existing moral and social relations, in the maintenance or reform of the existing order of things, have usually started with the first problem and have solved the second by the appeal to some existing natural, moral, social or divine law or system of laws. Metaphysicians, on the other hand, have usually started with an analysis of the psychological fact that all men as rational beings experience, in a greater or lesser degree, a sense of obligation, a feeling of duty, that they listen to the voice of conscience, that they are possessed of a moral sense. The difficulty then has been to define more closely and for practical purposes what this sense of duty really means, to evolve a code of morality which may become of practical use and guidance.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Bentham