

portant works on 'Logic' in 1843, on 'Political Economy' in 1848, and the first two volumes of his 'Dissertations and Discussions' in 1859. His Ethical treatise was accordingly a matured exposition and defence of his ethical views. Mill has himself, in his Autobiography, given expression to his high appreciation of Bentham's teachings,<sup>1</sup> of the influence they had on him, as well as of various other influences, unknown or disregarded by Bentham, but which assisted to mould his own opinions. He was an early student of the ancient philosophers, notably of the writings of Plato; he recognised that an entirely different spirit breathed in them from that of the current philosophy which surrounded him in his own country. Of the latter, he assimilated the psychological views first propounded by David Hartley,<sup>2</sup> but made more accessible by his father James Mill in his well-known 'Analysis of the Human Mind.' Through this channel he acquired the habit of regarding mental states, moral emotions and feelings, as complex phenomena, formed by the combination of simpler elements<sup>3</sup> under the influence of various forms of association. Thus he regarded mental characters, such as sympathy, benevolence, moral sense, &c., not as prime factors of men's moral constitution in the way that many representatives of religious, common-sense, or intuitional ethics had

<sup>1</sup> See *supra*, vol. iii. p. 313, note 2.

<sup>2</sup> See *supra*, vol. iii. p. 216, note 1 *sqq.*

<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless Mill betrays some suspicion that analysis into, and synthesis of, elements is not sufficient to explain the "concrete whole" which cannot be exhausted by these processes. See his re-

marks on Happiness, p. 55 of 'Utilitarianism.' Also the passage (p. 2) in which he explains that the relation of first principles to a science "is not that of foundations to an edifice, but of roots to a tree, which may perform their office equally well though they be never dug down to and exposed to light."