

done. With the aid of this psychological instrument, the dissecting analysis of the Association-psychology, he approached the principles of utility, happiness, and pleasure, upon which the morality of Benthamism was founded. These terms, under his treatment, acquired a larger and higher meaning. In this way he also departed from the exclusively quantitative estimate of pleasure which was adopted by Bentham. Thus he added to the different sources of obligation or sanctions, as Bentham termed them, one of which the latter omitted to take note,—man's feeling of unity with his fellow-creatures.¹ He admits that in most individuals this feeling is much inferior in strength to their selfish feelings and is often wanting altogether, but it presents itself to the minds of those who have it "as an attribute which it would not be well for them to be without"; and "this conviction is the ultimate sanction of the greatest-happiness" principle in morality.²

19.
Comte's
influence on
Mill.

Mill further came under the influence also of Auguste Comte, who gave prominence to this latter sentiment³ under the name of Altruism, which he opposed to Egoism.

¹ Professor Sorley, however, remarks that Bentham did mention what he called the "sympathetic sanction." See *Works by Bowring*, iii. 290; cf. Halévy, 'Le Formalisme du Radicalisme philosophique,' i. 284.

² 'Utilitarianism,' p. 49.

³ "If we now suppose this feeling of unity to be taught as a religion and the whole force of education, of institutions, and of opinion, directed; as it once was in the case of religion, to make every person grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides both by the profes-

sion and the practice of it, I think that no one, who can realise this conception, will feel any misgiving about the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the Happiness morality. To any ethical student who finds the realisation difficult I recommend, as a means of facilitating it, the second of M. Comte's two principal Works, 'Traité de Politique Positive'" (*ibid.*, p. 48). Here, however, as well as in the Tract 'On Liberty,' Mill expresses "the strongest objections to the system of politics and morals set forth in that Treatise."