

several problems as it was with Kant, in language free from possible misconstruction. He always spoke of the I, the Ego or the Self, meaning not only as Kant had meant, the individual mind as revealed to every one of us by introspection, but the universal Ego or Self, the universal mind which underlay and created the difference of subject and object, as well as the multiplicity of many individual minds.¹ It was therefore not before Hegel had dropped the terminology of Fichte and boldly placed the universal or absolute mind at the beginning of his speculation, that the real drift of much that Fichte had said before him became generally intelligible as a leading principle in philosophy, as a

¹ Fichte specially refers to the *Bewussteyn überhaupt*. I suppose this is something similar to what in modern English philosophy would be called the "concrete universal" of consciousness as such. "The presupposition is that it [the conception of our activity] is implied in consciousness as such and is necessarily posited with it. We therefore start with the form of consciousness as such, and make deductions from it, and our investigation is finished if in the course of our deductions we come back again to the conception of a sensuous activity" (*ibid.*, p. 4). It may incidentally be remarked that if Fichte had taken the psychological view and not, as Kant already objected, the purely logical, he might have brought out more clearly what is implied in the whole of his argumentation. Indeed, we may see in the latter foreshadowed what in the course of the nineteenth century has been more clearly brought out by such thinkers as Renouvier (see *supra*, vol. iii. p. 206, n.) and by Jas. Ward

in his doctrine of the (sensory and motor) presentation-continuum (see *supra*, vol. iii. p. 280, n., 291). In fact, Fichte would have urged, more emphatically than he did, the fundamental synopsis in the development of the phenomena of consciousness. As it is, he, in many passages, insists upon *Anschaung*, *i.e.*, 'seeing,' 'sight,' or 'feeling,' as the fundamental fact of consciousness. This term has been unfortunately translated by 'intuition,' which suggests more than an immediate "awareness" (see *supra*, vol. iii. p. 612, n.). There is also no doubt that Fichte felt increasingly the necessity of a deeper psychological justification of his whole system, as is clearly seen from the latest work which he prepared for publication, the 'Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns.' The late Prof. Adamson in his 'Introduction' to Fichte's Philosophy ('Fichte,' Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, 1881) remarks that much of Fichte's penetrating analysis reminds one of similar work among British psychologists.