

All purely abstract morality or ethics, dominated by the idea of duty, must fail to give due weight to the individual differences of human beings, to conceive of duty as something different for every rational being. These systems emphasise only what should be common to all, the universal law, whether of thought or of conduct, be it Natural, Moral, or Divine. Against this view Schleiermacher assimilates, from the monadology of Leibniz, the idea that the individual is, in every instance, an independent mirror of the whole universe, capable of reflecting in itself and destined to reflect the whole from an individual point of view, to realise in an individual example the common ideal.

In connection with this appreciation of individuality and personality, Schleiermacher attaches, in his ethical treatises, more importance to what the moral life should

logical point of view there was a want of empirical psychology such as has been all along cultivated pre-eminently in this country. It may incidentally be mentioned that this one-sided regard for the abstract, the pure, possibly the ideal self, is intimately connected with Fichte's autocratic and domineering character, which stands in marked contrast to the sympathetic and receptive mind of Schleiermacher. How this gradually led to an estrangement between these two great thinkers is brought out in a masterly manner by Dilthey (*loc. cit.*, pp. 334-348). He quotes the following passage from Fichte's 'Sittenlehre,' Werke, iv. p. 254: "Already we have separated clearly pure reason from individuality. The expression and realisation of what is pure in a reasoning self is the moral law, individuality is what distinguishes one individual

from another. The connecting link of the pure and empirical lies in this, that a rational being must fain be an individual but not necessarily this or that one; that any one is this or that individual is accidental and of empirical origin. The empirical is the will, the understanding, and the body. The object of the moral law is distinctly nothing individual but reason in general" [*Vernunft überhaupt*]. "... The absolute annihilation of the individual and merger of the same in absolute pure reason or in God, is indeed the last aim of finite reason; only this is not possible in time." Dilthey communicates (Appendix, p. 123) a passage from Schleiermacher's 'Diary' as probably bearing upon this: "That one cannot have individuality without personality is the elegiac theme of true mysticism."