

the ethical problem, we find that the whole tenor of his thought is more akin to that of the German idealists than to that of Kant or of English psychology or common-sense. His philosophy is dogmatic in the sense of being uncritical, forming thus an opposition to Kant's method, and his method is synthetic or constructive in opposition to the analytic method represented in English thought pre-eminently by the two Mills and by Alexander Bain. It also resembles the speculations of Schelling and Hegel<sup>1</sup> in this, that it has a profound

<sup>1</sup> Nothing is more striking than the similarity which exists in many respects between such opposite systems as those of Comte and Hegel. Not only the dogmatic, the architectonic, and the profound historical spirit are common to both, but even the abstract notions and the vocabulary of the idealistic system may be easily translated into those of the positivist. This has in fact been done already without any knowledge of Comte's writings, to a large extent by Ludwig Feuerbach in the expressive formula: *homo homini Deus*. And so far as Ethics is concerned the two systems agree in this, that their spirit is essentially ethical in the deepest sense of the term, but that, on the other side, the more specific problems of ethical science, as treated by ancient thinkers, by philosophers in this country and, quite recently, in all the three countries alike, receive in the two systems which represent two leading tendencies of modern thought no systematic treatment. We look there in vain for strict definition of such notions as the Good, Virtue, Duty and their relations. The ethical views of Hegel as well as those of Comte have to be collected from different passages and periods of their respective writings. But

Hegel's philosophy sprang, as did that of Kant and Fichte, from the same root of a strong moral conviction regarding the task which philosophy, as the intellectual training and discipline of the mind, was destined to perform in his age and country. A similar intellectualism, joined to a deep moral conviction, is likewise characteristic of Comte. In both cases the intellectual principle, a definite theory of reality, being gained, the application to detailed problems such as those of religion and ethics, had to follow. The application was made by those who came after. In connection with Hegel's philosophy the religious problem was taken up in Germany and, a generation later, the ethical problem in England. Comte himself turned only quite late, as stated in the text, to Ethics, confining himself mainly to the development of the religion of humanity. Though this has been practically abandoned in this country, an important school of positivist ethical doctrine has sprung up with an increasing influence on French thought. Quite independent of the idealist and positivist conception of ethics the influence of Kant is also increasingly felt both in Germany and in France. It may also here be remarked that, as in so many other