

over the purely animal attributes of human nature. As the highest among the former he counts benevolence, the habit of living for others: his moral ideal consists thus in complete self-devotion in which all personal or selfish considerations disappear. In addition to this Comte aims at a definite Order of society, based upon a philosophical creed and manifested in a hierarchy not unlike that which prevailed in the middle ages during the undisputed sway of the Roman Catholic Church. But the power which builds up and pervades this new Order is not the faith of the old religion, but the scientific spirit, the supreme control of the intellect which is to gain the same undisputed sway in the social as it has gained in the natural and especially the mathematical sciences and their applications.¹

¹ Referring again to what was stated (*supra*, p. 186, note), the similarity or parallelism between an idealistic and a positivist attitude towards the ethical problem is strikingly brought out by Professor Jodl in treating of a thinker who may be looked upon as an extreme representative of the former school. This was Karl Chr. Fr. Krause (1781-1832) the propounder of a system termed Panentheism, the attempt to combine the pantheistic and theistic conceptions of the nature of the Absolute. His voluminous writings, of which only a few were published during his lifetime, had only a small influence on European thought, notable only in the philosophy of law through one of his disciples, H. Ahrens (1808-1874, Professor at Brussels and Leipzig). The passage is striking and instructive and worth quoting: "Involuntarily these views of Krause suggest a comparison with Auguste Comte. The ethics of both tend

towards the proclamation of a religion of humanity which appears here in a metaphysical, there in a positivist clothing; confining itself there to the given world and the knowable connection of things, but extending here in bold flight the thoughts and deeds of man beyond the limits of the universe. The contrast of aspects which is here evident is in its innermost essence insoluble, as both sides are equally given in experience. . . . Human consciousness is not self-creative, it rests on a foundation which it has not made itself and which we may with equal justice call unconscious or superconscious. The positivist need not further consider it, it being for him a given fact, but he cannot wish to deny it; but this feeling of dependence upon vast mysterious powers . . . marks exactly that point of empirical certitude from which the speculative and religious aspect did, and will always, start. Disregarding