

successors, to give to morality a metaphysical foundation, to absorb ethics in metaphysics, or to neglect it altogether, which, as it seemed to him, meant to misunderstand fundamentally the ethical problem.

Herbart did not do much to elaborate this fruitful and, to a considerable extent, novel aspect. It was elaborated by a thinker who for some time was counted among the disciples of Herbart, but who distinctly repudiated this honour, though much of his thought recalls the influence both of Herbart and Leibniz. This thinker was Hermann Lotze, in whose system the conception of value or worth assumed a commanding position and received a definite expression. To this I have had occasion to refer already in the last chapter, in dealing with the problem of the Beautiful.¹ Lotze did not confine himself, as Herbart did, to a registration of our æsthetical or ethical judgments of value, he gave to the conception of value a place in his metaphysical system, differing in this fundamentally from Herbart; he maintained that by the human mind the actual world is comprehended by contemplating it from three logically independent aspects, which in experience and practice are intricately interwoven: the world of facts or things, the world of laws or relations, and the world of values or worths. Although subsequent speculation has not, either in Germany or in this country, adopted verbatim this formula of Lotze's, there is no doubt that, as in many other respects, modern thought in both countries is knowingly or unknowingly indebted to Lotze for a special expression and revival of the

47.
Lotze's
doctrine
of values.

¹ See *supra*, p. 64 *sqq.*