

also indications in the writings of Mill as well as in those of Spencer, that he was not unaware of the insufficiency of what we may now term the purely naturalistic or mechanical view of things; both thinkers somewhat vaguely recognised the existence of an agency for which they could find no room or no name in their systems, an agency which thinkers of a different school regard as fundamental, and introduce from the start under the designation of Mind, Spirit, or some cognate expression. What Spencer merely hints at is more clearly stated by Professor Sorley in the concluding pages of his book, as a result of a careful analysis and criticism of the older utilitarian and the more recent evolutionist forms of the Ethics of Naturalism. The great advance which the latter form marks in comparison with its predecessor is that it puts in the place of statical or fixed conceptions the dynamical conditions and conceptions of progress and development, thus giving in many ways a better account of the movements in nature and human society. But this advantage of being better able to understand the changes which have taken place and are still taking place around us, is to a great extent balanced by the inability of all evolutionary theories to arrive at a definite standard, be it for our estimation of human action or for the definition of the *summum bonum*, the Good. We may perhaps look on with indifference or with resignation at the destruction of the hope and faith in some ultimate truth which animated

tains a chapter on the "Dynamical Element in Life," in which I have contended that the theory of a vital principle fails and that the

physico-chemical theory also fails; the corollary being that in its ultimate nature Life is incomprehensible" ('Nature,' 20th Oct. 1898).