

the earlier philosophies, both of Nature and of Mind, admitting that research in both regions can neither find a beginning nor define an end which is not subject to doubt, that its correctness is merely a question of method; we may be able to lower the ideal of truth, from being a definite axiom with which we start, or an end which we reach, to that of being merely a correct process of thought; but we cannot, without the risk of losing all hold and support, give up the belief in the existence of a supreme and unalterable moral standard, from which we are able to judge the value of actions, the motives as well as the aims of human conduct. It seems contrary to human nature to rest content in the region of practice with a fluctuating and merely temporary rule, however much modern science and modern philosophy have combined in shaking our faith in the capacities of the human intellect to arrive at any permanently truthful statement of ultimate facts. The modern definition of scientific or philosophical truth, as consisting merely in the correct method or in the logical consistency of ideas, has in fact made science, in the wider sense of the word, apparently incapable of affording a foundation for morality, of formulating a creed that can deal adequately with the principles of action. To express it in other words, we may say that science in the larger sense of the term has gained, in the course of the nineteenth century, very largely in ideas and aspects, in canons and methods of thought, but that it has, in proportion, lost its older axioms as well as its ideals: the fixed foundation on which to build and the fixed end to be kept in view. But these two data form