

they appear, *e.g.*, in the system of Spencer, but that from them proceeds an initiative, not only in the inner, but also in the outer life of the human mind. He further maintains that all psychical states, be they sensations, thoughts, emotions, or desires, are intimately connected, that they cannot be isolated and treated as independent elements of the inner life. He thus opposes likewise the older psychological atomism, maintaining that we feel, think, and react in every instant of our conscious inner life; only it may happen that, in this fundamental and united function, either feelings and emotions, or definite thoughts, or activities of the will, step into the foreground. In fact, "every state of consciousness, by reason of its proper intensity or of its force, tends to determine movements more or less intensive and extensive." Thinking, feeling, and willing are therefore always connected with some movement, and this is both an internal change and an external motion. The partial separation of thinking and motion, of thought and action, is acquired under the influence of education and culture both of the individual and the race. With children and savages this distinct separation is rare or altogether absent. Further, "every idea is an image and in consequence a 'Together' of recalled sensations and movements."¹

Fouillée begins his criticism of the Ethics of Natural-

¹ As already stated there is no equivalent in English for the word *ensemble*. Fouillée is one of the most prominent representatives of the tendency of thought repeatedly referred to in these volumes, a tendency which I have defined as

"the synoptic aspect of reality," and of which I have treated separately in two papers published respectively in the 3rd and 5th vols. of the 'Proceedings of the University of Durham Philosophical Society,' 1910 and 1913.