

What is peculiar to the school is, however, the limitation to the purely psychological or anthropological aspect, the metaphysical being discarded. It is owing to this circumstance, to their distrust of metaphysics, that these thinkers show little sympathy with, and little appreciation of, the system of Lotze, which they mostly ignore. To Lotze, nevertheless, is due the merit of having for the first time clearly distinguished between the three seemingly independent, but interwoven, aspects which the world presents to the contemplating mind: the world of things or facts, the world of relations or laws, and the world of values or worths. Lotze is at the same time the first thinker who has coined a fairly comprehensive vocabulary wherein to express the doctrines of a science of value, or, as it has been more recently termed, of Axiology.

Although this school has opened out and is cultivating a new region in Psychology—a region in which individual and social interests, the ethics of morality and of legality meet—and has thus enlarged the aspect of one side of moral philosophy, it has not so far succeeded in establishing any new conceptions regarding the central ethical problems: the problem of Good and Evil, the problem of Duty and Obligation, the problem of Virtue and Happiness, the problem of Ends and Motives of conduct; nor is it likely that the purely descriptive, analytical, or historical method will take us any further as regards those fundamental questions. It is therefore not surprising that another direction of thought has sprung up which shows little appreciation for these purely descriptive, analytical, and historical