worths; on the other we have a brilliant and emphatic proclamation of the claims of individuality and personality, of a phenomenon which in many modern scientific and economic theories has been pushed into the background and lost sight of. But neither of these two interesting lines of thought has really done much to attack the central ethical problem— the problem of the Good. This still stands before us in its two-faced aspect: first, the Good as a thing to possess or to strive for (*Güterlehre*); and secondly, Good as a predicate of human will and conduct (*Tugend- und Pflichtenlehre*) and of everything connected therewith: on the one side the purpose, on the other side the character of human activity. It is, however, perhaps not too much to say that this dualism, this twofold aspect of the moral problem, has been more clearly defined in recent ethical literature in Germany as well as in this country; it has been brought more closely home to the philosophical consciousness of the age. In this country the task has been performed, as I stated above, by Henry Sidgwick[1] in his 'Methods of Ethics,'

72.
Two theories of the Good: ends and duties.

[1] During the last years of the century and since that time a large number of treatises on the subject of ethics have appeared in all the three countries, testifying quite as much to the interest taken in the subject as to its intricacy and to the inherent, as it seems to many, wellnigh insoluble paradoxes and dilemmas which reveal themselves to closer critical study such as has been started in this country by Sidgwick in the 'Methods of Ethics' and by Bradley in 'Ethical Studies.' The psychology of the moral sense is not so simple as it appeared before these two thinkers took up the subject, nor even as Paulsen has put it in the article referred to in the text. This must become abundantly evident to readers of German ethical literature in the important work of Prof. Geo. Simmel, whose 'Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft' (2 vols., 1892-1893) may be singled out among a great many other publications mostly belonging to the present century. Indeed there is perhaps a danger of casuistry forming too prominent a chapter of ethical theory.