

taken up by Kant. His philosophy—as we have had repeated occasion to observe—had a dual aspect: a purely intellectual and a pronounced ethical side. The latter had been forcibly and independently urged by Fichte with very definite practical results, but I have had occasion to show in former chapters how this practical and moral interest was pushed into the background by the intellectual or æsthetical interests which for a time supervened and dominated philosophical speculation during the first third of the century. It ended and in a manner collapsed with the romantic movement.

The greatest example we have of a re-establishment of the stricter ethical view in dealing with the religious problem in opposition to the purely logical and the freer æsthetical aspects, is to be found in Schleiermacher's later treatment of the subject as compared with the earlier, which is contained in the celebrated 'Reden über die Religion.'

All this indicates a *fourth* point of view, which we may call the ethical, gained by a union of the positions of Kant and Schleiermacher.

To this we must add a *fifth* aspect which has been urged from the side of psychology, but not of that older psychology which was known and familiar to Kant and Schleiermacher, the introspective analysis of the human mind. It has been urged from the side of that other and modern psychology which calls itself an exact or a natural science. Herbart started it in Germany in opposition to Kant, but it received its great development from the twofold influence of English psychology on the one side and of the mathematical and physio-

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Union of
Kant's
ethics and
Schleier-
macher's
psychology.