

logical studies of Fechner and Wundt on the other. What this school has to say regarding religious life and phenomena is introduced through the conception of value. The fundamental psychological fact upon which ethical and æsthetical judgments depend is the value which the contemplating mind attaches to certain things and processes of nature, and still more emphatically to certain forms of human conduct. This conception admits of a spiritual as well as a naturalistic interpretation. It can be enlarged into the conception of a world of values or worths, of things which are valuable in themselves and deserve to exist as such. They may be conceived either—in the spirit of Plato—as ideals, as things of supreme worth which human beings have to accept as standards of judgment and aims of conduct, or, they may consist merely in norms or rules of conduct to be consciously or unconsciously abstracted out of the natural development of the human race and human society, in the same way as what we call laws of nature are gained by reflection and abstraction from the region of observed phenomena.

The former, the ideal or spiritual, view was in recent times distinctly proclaimed by Lotze, and has from him been introduced through Albrecht Ritschl into theological literature. The latter, or naturalistic interpretation of the ideas of value, forms a characteristic side of Positivism, and still more so of that recent school of ethics which has adopted the modern canons of development as established by the theories of descent and the philosophy of evolution.

We must now trace somewhat more in detail the