

arguments and speculations which have been put forth from these different and distinct sides. They comprise the philosophical treatment of the problem of the spirit or the religious problem.

Recent studies in Kantian philosophy, notably those of the late Professor Paulsen of Berlin, have emphasised the fact that Kant's primary interest in the whole of his philosophy was a religious interest, the reconciliation of faith and knowledge, of religion and science.¹ This is acknowledged, as Paulsen has shown, not only by those who with him esteem the labours of Kant, but also by those who condemn him, be it that they, with Haeckel, consider that Kant has sacrificed the philosophical to the religious, or, with Willmann, that he has sacrificed the religious to the philosophical interest.² The religious interest for Kant

¹ See *supra*, vol. iii. pp. 340-342, and especially the quotations given in the notes.

² The following extract from Paulsen's Introduction ('Immanuel Kant,' 4th ed., 1904, p. 8 *sqq.*) is interesting, and may serve in the place of fuller references to the two writers named in the text: "The negative dogmatism or naturalism with its verdict on Kant is represented in our times by E. Haeckel. In his 'Welträtsel' Kant appears as the genuine representative of a retrograde academic philosophy which coquettes with the supernaturalism of an obsolete clerical belief; depending upon the latter in order to find in the dark regions of transcendental philosophy a hiding-place from the intruding natural sciences, the ultimate compelling motive being found in a regard for the 'powers that be,' who see in

pure truth, as naturalistic monism teaches it, a danger for the State or for their own governing position; 'the fear of the Lord,' not of the Heavenly One, is considered to be the original source of a favoured 'dualism'; as also Kant is said to have been brought, in his later days, to reintroduce the three main spectres—God, Freedom, and Immortality—after having, in his younger days, already recognised the truth of 'Monism.' . . . Not less contemptuous is the verdict of positive dogmatism. Especially scholastic philosophy, roused again into a semblance of life, directs its many-voiced chorus of attack against the critical philosophy as the root of unbelief and of all evil. Criticism as the fundamental form of subjective, erroneous, and destructive idealism is contrasted with Thomism as the fundamental form of constructive idealism.