

It was the latter part of Kant's doctrine which not only attracted a large number of his followers and disciples, but also gave it special value in the eyes of Schiller and Fichte, who were the first to attempt a further development of Kant's teaching on original lines. Unfortunately, however, Kant had not put the dualism which is inherent in the human aspect of things quite in the right light. This dualism, in the course of further criticism, especially through psychological analysis, has been more correctly expressed than Kant was able to express it.

We now understand that the twofold aspect is owing to the difference of what may be termed external sensations and the inner sense of a combining unity. Now, although this distinction, which has been much more rigidly adhered to in British philosophy, was recognised by Kant, it was unfortunately mixed up with another distinction which tends to obliterate it, and to shift the whole problem on to a different ground.

This second formula was introduced into Kantian philosophy from the Leibniz-Wolffian school. It is the supposed difference between a sensible and an intelligible world or, as Kant expresses it, between the phenomenal and the noumenal order of things. This distinction implies that there are things of which we can become immediately cognisant through our senses, and that there are other things which we know of only mediately through thought, and it was accompanied by the tacit assumption that the former things constitute, as it were, a lower order as compared with the others which constitute the higher order of things; thus in-

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