

roducing a difference of subordination in the place of that of co-ordination. In the course of subsequent thought and analysis it has become gradually clear that the difference is not one of higher and lower, nor of more or less certainty, but that the difference is one of exactness or of definition.

Some of our sensations appear to be localised in space, and are accordingly capable of greater definition and exactness. They form a large portion of what we term the experience of our outer or bodily senses. Compared with these, the remainder of our experience of the outer or bodily senses, as well as the whole of the experience of our inner sense, is less defined and less permanent, but all experiences are equally immediate and self-evident: in fact, they together form our world of experience or the phenomenal world; all that we know of reality. Neither of the two, neither the defined nor the undefined, ever occurs alone: they are continually inter-mixed, forming, as it were, the warp and woof of our mental structure; and it is only for very special purposes that we pluck them asunder.

The object of science and philosophy being to make things clearer, more definite and communicable, progress depends to a large extent upon eliminating, in our picture of the world, those traits which are not capable of exact definition, reducing the actually knowable more and more to a small number of exact and well-defined differences.¹

¹ It is a process of selection which begins in our infancy with the aid of memory, attention, and intersubjective intercourse. These break up what James Ward terms "the original continuum of presentations" (sensory and motor), and William James the "stream of