

ties were looked upon as the true characteristics of an objective and real world, whereas the secondary qualities were looked upon as the evanescent, changing, and subjective appearance of this real world. Now for those who believed in spiritual realities, *i.e.*, in a higher super-sensuous region of things, it became necessary in some way or other to explain the relation of this super-sensuous world to the actual world with which mathematics and mechanics are concerned.

As Paulsen has clearly shown,¹ two views existed when Kant approached the problem—the view of the mathematicians, headed by Newton and more or less adopted by English philosophers, and the view of the metaphysicians, headed by Leibniz.

The first view considers time and space (these being the quantities with which mathematics and dynamics operate) to be the actual receptacle of things. The second view looks upon time and space, not as actual things, but only as relations between things. This latter view is intolerable to the scientific mind; but it allows us to reduce reality to something quite different beneath and beyond the apparent forms of existence, and this may, in thought, be identified with the supernatural. It thus saves the great spiritual verities, relegating them to an order of things which we can think but not directly experience.

The other, or mathematical view, made natural theology impossible, or reduced the theistic conception of the Divine Being to a sort of pantheism, which collapsed before the scepticism of Hume.

¹ 'Immanuel Kant' (4th ed., 1904, p. 171 *sqq.*).