

These being the two views which Kant found current¹ in the philosophy of his predecessors, he set to work to reconcile them, his object being to vindicate the belief in the supernatural (or what he terms the transcendent) whilst at the same time admitting the correctness of the mechanical or mathematical view. The reconciliation is attempted by the celebrated doctrine of the ideality of time and space, *i.e.*, the view that time and space are the necessary forms inherent in the human intellect in and through which it arranges and conceives the manifold data of the senses. Being inherent in the human mind, the science which deals with the forms of time and space is a necessary science; necessary to us thinking beings and inseparable from our knowledge of external things which we see only in and through them. At the same time this view, which implies the subjectivity or unreality likewise of the primary qualities, leaves over, as the real but unexplained kernel of reality, the conception of a something which we can only think but not describe: the "thing in itself," the celebrated X of Kantian philosophy.

19.
The recon-
ciliation.

This conception of a "thing in itself," incorrectly

¹ "The two discarded views are those through which Kant himself had passed. . . . He stood originally in the position of German metaphysics: space an empirical conception, abstracted from the relations of external things. He then went over to the second view (Newton-Clarke): space the pre-existing form of the physical world. This view, which he still distinctly defends in 1768, he

suddenly drops, evidently as metaphysically insupportable, and places himself in the new position: space and time are *a priori* forms of the physical world (as Newton has it), but, together with the physical world, existent only in the sensuous aspect, which was really also Leibniz' opinion, as Kant himself remarks." (Paulsen, *loc. cit.*, p. 172 n.)