

extended to the conception of "things in themselves," has dominated a large portion of German speculation ever since Kant. It has never been really accepted as a workable view either in England or in France. It has indeed cropped up in English philosophy in the "Unknowable" of Herbert Spencer, where it was arrived at by a different line of reasoning, but—be it noted—likewise in an attempt to reconcile science and religion.

Many of the arguments directed against Spencer's position are merely reproductions of the polemics directed nearly a century earlier against Kant. There are, accordingly, some opponents who maintain that it is illogical to speak of the existence of an unknown thing if you really know nothing whatever about it, for its existence can only be known to you through some kind of property or relation. There are others who maintain that this underlying ground or kernel of reality, though unknown so far as the outer world is concerned, is not unknown to us so far as our own subjective or inner world is concerned; for we ourselves are not only a succession of sensations, but are conscious of the connection, unity, and continuity of that succession. This view (which for a moment would pass through an impracticable and untenable solipsism) is at once expanded into the conception of a larger consciousness which embraces other minds besides our own; as we exist and think to a large extent only in, through, and with them.

A third class of thinkers deny the correctness of the whole reasoning, be it the older of Kant or the