

absorbing influence of the pantheism of Spinoza. In many instances this led to a renewed appreciation of the philosophy of Leibniz which recognised the twofold order of things, the truths of nature as well as those of grace, and ever strove for a reconciliation.

Thus we may point to a second and independent influence which made itself felt apart from that of Spinoza and which was akin to the spirit of Leibniz' philosophy,—this was the historical interest, the idea of development. The philosophical system in which this was most intimately combined with the monistic and pantheistic spirit of Spinozism was the system of Hegel. His most original work, 'The Phenomenology of the Mind,' is hardly intelligible if we conceive the spiritual element merely as a divine order in the manner of Fichte's earlier writings, still less if we conceive it as an indifferent identity or absolute in the manner of Schelling in his earlier speculations; we are bound to conceive this spiritual factor as a personal self-conscious activity, and to combine with the pantheistic idea of the Absolute the theistic conception of a personal Deity. But the difficulties inherent in Hegel's style and exposition are much enhanced by the fact that the word "*Geist*" can be understood in an impersonal as well as in a personal sense; and indeed, in the further developments of his philosophical principle, both sides, the personal and the impersonal, are continually interchanged and employed for the explanation of the conscious processes of the individual mind on the one side and of the unconscious workings of the objective mind on the other.