

however, after Hegel's death, a younger generation began to criticise and examine more closely the actual structure of the system and the method of its dialectic, it was found that the latter was a purely logical process, operating with the most abstract categories of thought, and enlivened only by side glances at, and interesting excursions into, the large expanse of real life which Hegel's encyclopædic mind had always in view and at its command. Under the hands of many of his disciples and followers the dialectical process was reduced to a dry logical scheme, to a monotonous repetition of a soulless rhythm; whereas real fruits and results were harvested by those who, dropping the logical skeleton, threw themselves into historical research and the study of facts, where they gradually forgot the abstract formulæ with which they had started. This purely logical substructure of the system became more prominent through a further characteristic defect: the absence of a specifically ethical teaching, of an adequate treatment of the moral problem which had been such a marked characteristic in Kant's philosophy, and also in that of Fichte. All this had the result of creating a reaction against the purely logical tone, the panlogism of Hegel, in favour of a more realistic and sympathetic, if also less imaginative and fanciful, treatment of the great philosophical problems, notably of the moral and religious problems. The reaction was assisted by that great volume of critical and historical, of psychological and anthropological research to which disciples and opponents of Hegel contributed equally.

The earliest opposition to the purely intellectual and