

has not contributed anything fundamentally new to the outstanding philosophical problem of the spirit. This was much more clearly understood by Schleiermacher than by Ritschl, for, even if we gratefully accept Ritschl's position and admit that theological speculation requires to start, like every other science, from an axiomatic foundation, with a definite principle, there still remain two questions for the philosopher to answer. The first is the psychological question, clearly put by Jacobi, Fries, and Schleiermacher. It is the question concerning the essence of the religious feeling or sentiment. How does this originate in the human soul? Kant had put the question regarding exact or mathematical knowledge in this way: How have we to conceive the constitution of the human mind so as to explain the existence of exact science? Similarly we can put the religious problem in this form: How are we to conceive the constitution of the human soul so as to explain the existence of religious faith, the immediate, not mediated, certainty and conviction of the believing soul? What Ritschl has done to solve this problem is, to say the least, fragmentary and incomplete.

A further problem remains outstanding for philosophy of religion: granted that there is a twofold order of things, a natural order and a spiritual order,—the latter finding its practical expression in the moral and religious society: we shall wish to form some idea of the relation of these two different orders; we shall

osophy, of which Lotze is the greatest representative. He himself confesses to having been a learner up to the end, and we

can detect strong external influences during the various periods of his remarkable career.