

tion, to give a more definite expression to his underlying conviction that the highest form of existence can be satisfactorily represented to the human soul only in that of Personality. On many occasions in his writings and lectures he recurs to this thesis, trying to defend it against criticisms which had been variously applied to it. These criticisms can all be brought back to the dictum of Spinoza, that individuation is identical with limitation. This idea had been introduced and more emphatically urged in idealistic philosophy by Fichte, who put in the place of the Divine Person, as the centre and ruler of the universe, the idea of a Divine Order which he considered to be a higher and nobler conception than that of a Personal Deity as represented in the narrow anthropomorphising theology of his day. Though admiring the elevation and purity of Fichte's conception, Lotze does not agree with him in denying to the Absolute the highest epithet of personality. According to him, the attributes by which we try to describe the essence of the Divine spring from two distinct sources: "Metaphysical attributes such as unity, eternity, omnipresence, and omnipotence determine the Divine as the ground of all reality in the finite; ethical attributes such as wisdom, justice, and holiness satisfy our desire to find in the highest Reality that also which possesses the greatest value for us. . . . The desire of the soul to conceive as real that which it is permitted to regard as the highest cannot be satisfied by any other form of existence than that of personality."¹

¹ See Lotze 'Microcosmus,' 1st ed., vol. iii. p. 559. The defence of the notion of Personality constitutes one of the main efforts of