

with many other conservative English thinkers of the day, lest the disastrous consequences of Hegel's Philosophy, such as had been arrived at in Germany by Feuerbach in theoretical and by Strauss and Baur in their historical studies pertaining to religion, should spread also and be accepted in this country.

Over and against the purely negative philosophical movement then prevalent in German thought Mansel sets a positive assertion; in fact, he resorts to Revelation in a much more decisive and emphatic manner than Hamilton or Bacon had done before him. Thus he took a very short way towards that position which Schelling, in the latest phase of his philosophy, tried to reach through a complicated and mystical process of reasoning. The Bampton Lectures created a great impression, but the argument was discarded both by believers and sceptics — by F. D. Maurice, who made a strong attack on it, as well as by J. S. Mill, who loathed it.¹ Reference to this once famous line of

58.
Attacked by
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Mill.

¹ Those of Maurice and Mill are only two among the many important criticisms which appeared at the time, but I have chosen them because they indicate the two directions in which the religious problem has been treated in subsequent philosophic literature in this country, not without influence from continental thought. Both recognised the necessity of getting beyond the agnostic position which became clearly defined immediately after the appearance of the Bampton Lectures. The answer given by Mill in company with prominent thinkers abroad is Idealism. "The Ideal" becomes in some way or other the expression

of the Highest, a guiding principle, and eventually an object of reverence; with some it is supposed to be reached by a process of logical thought. The answer given by Maurice is more on the lines adopted by Schleiermacher. It is not idealistic but spiritualistic. Its subject cannot be reached but only interpreted by philosophic thought; its central idea is the spirit, what Renouvier termed the "Category of Personality," and it rests upon a larger and fuller psychology, a broader mental experience. Maurice seems to have had a clear view of this when he wrote: "True æsthetics [using this term in the Kantian sense] must have actually nothing