

cally represented by Kant's work. It had, indeed, been started already by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, but it had found its answer here in a reversion to common-sense and not in any deeper investigation. How much such an investigation was required can be seen if we, for instance, look somewhat more closely at the passage just quoted from Huxley's contribution to the 'Symposium.' He there maintains his unproved conviction that morality is strong enough to hold its own. As to this, the question may be asked, Does he mean by morality simply the sense of obligation to some rule of conduct, or does he mean by it a special, and if so, what rule? He further, at least, indicates that some dogma or highest truth may be required whereby and whereon to settle the definition of morality or of the Good, and he desires that this be proved; but he does not stop to indicate what kind of proof would be satisfactory to him.

67.
Can there
be an inde-
pendent
morality?

It is needless after what we have learned in the present and former chapters of this history to remind the reader that these are some of the questions which have been discussed at great length by continental, especially German, philosophers during the nineteenth century. The necessity to discuss them did not seem to be recognised in this country till quite two generations later, for reasons which I have repeatedly indicated. Notably the practically most important of these questions, the ethical problem,—as I showed in the foregoing chapter,—received quite a new start and interest through Henry Sidgwick's 'Methods of Ethics,' the first edition of which appeared three years before the 'Symposium,'