religion, like St Augustine, than to the normal type of European thinker represented pre-eminently by Aristotle. . . . He saw in the world what he felt in himself, a vain effort after ever new objects of desire which give no permanent satisfaction; and this view, becoming predominant, determined, not, indeed, all the ideas of his philosophy, but its general complexion as a 'philosophy of redemption.'" 1

Schopenhauer's philosophy stood in opposition to his own private life; it was purely objective. He did not attempt to practise what he taught. He stood outside the world of active and striving persons; he contemplated it as a spectator, comfortably seated in a stall, looks on at a theatrical performance, and unravels the plot without entangling himself in its successive Scenes and Acts. The conclusion he arrives at is, that there is more evil than good, that the principle of action, the human Will, is the source of this evil, and that in the negation of all desire in a complete quietism, similar to the Nirvana of the Buddhist, is to be found the redemption from evil.

Quite different from the solution of the problem which Schopenhauer offers to others, but does not follow himself, is that of Nietzsche. With him, the teaching is purely subjective: a reflection of the state of his own mind, of the unrest and unsatisfied striving of his own nature. If Schopenhauer prescribes to others resignation, the negation of desire, and preaches as the highest virtue that of compassion, Nietzsche preaches the doctrine of uncontrolled energy, of self-

^{1 &#}x27;Schopenhauer,' by Thos. Whittaker; Constable's Series, 1909 (p. 1 sqq.).