

current systems of moral and religious thought which he combats and rejects are, so far as morality is concerned, the sense of obligation and the demand for a higher sanction; and, so far as religion is concerned, the existence of a special doctrine or of a body of dogma. He aims at a morality "without obligation and sanction," and at a religion without dogma; the former position is new and original to him; the latter was not an unknown conception with several German thinkers already in the middle of the century, who talked of the religious spirit without a definite religion or, as they termed it, of "religiosity without religion." In this manner Guyau opposes what the whole of religious philosophy and all practical morals and religion have considered indispensable—viz., a definite and obligatory moral law and a simple or elaborate, but, in any case, a definite system of beliefs. In proportion as the conviction has forced itself upon thinkers from many sides that reality and certitude, so far as the human mind is concerned, can be attained, not by any single assertion, but only by a more or less consistent, coherent, and stable system or order of ideas; further, that the system of ideas and conceptions elaborated by science has no centre and no finality; it has become increasingly clear to many that, to satisfy the higher needs of the human soul, there must exist another and a higher order, and that

sont en partie une déviation de plusieurs des doctrines que Guyau avait déjà soutenues; il importe donc au plus haut point de rétablir le vrai et le normal sous certaines

altérations pathologiques qui, grâce au génie littéraire de Nietzsche, peuvent séduire tant de simples ou tant de raffinés à la recherche du neuf." (p. ii.)