

Secondly, this process of analysing, so prominent in the mechanical and chemical sciences, was in the beginning supposed to have some finality. In the sequel, however, it was found to lead further and further away from the starting-point, to be in fact interminable. Molecules were analysed into atoms, and these again enormously subdivided into electrons or particles. The cell, the unit of organic structure, was found to be a very complicated system, and even the nucleus or kernel with its nucleolus in the cell presented itself as a microcosm, an assemblage of an enormous number of units, which, being far beyond the powers of the microscope, are indeed most hypothetical and have received fanciful names, of which a whole catalogue might easily be written down.

For these two reasons the atomising process of scientific thought proved ultimately to be quite as endless in its application as it was hopeless in its capability of ever grasping the reality of things. Promising on the one side unlimited discovery of new facts and many practical results, it discouraged on the other side all hope that by and through it any comprehensive view could ever be attained. Thus it has come about that a contrary tendency of thought has made itself increasingly felt, the tendency to look at things in their together, not in their isolation: in their complexity and not in their simplicity. This was recognised, first of all, in the biological sciences.¹ It was seen that things

¹ There are, however, notable instances in which the same tendency showed itself also in the purely physical and mathematical

sciences. Among these, two may be mentioned. How little the new methods fell in with the prevalent trend of ideas in their respective