

Christian ethics. But, as already remarked,¹ neither psychology nor ethics forms an integral part, or receives adequate recognition, in Comte's philosophy. As it was only at the end of his philosophical development that he came to assign to ethics an important position, so also it was only after having completed the greater of his two larger treatises that he liberated himself from the early conception, inherited from Cabanis, that psychology is merely a department or appendix of physiology. He came to see that the individual man is not merely a biological unit but is an object of special scientific study.² Still the subordination of man as an individual to his existence as a social being remains; and with it the emphasis given to a truth which has played an increasingly important part in recent psychology and sociology.³

¹ See also *supra*, p. 487.

² This is well brought out by Mr Whittaker in his Tract on 'Comte and Mill' (Constable's 'Philosophies Ancient and Modern,' 1908), especially chapter v. "By the time he had completed the 'Cours de Philosophie Positive,' Comte perceived the necessity of a revision, as he told Mill in their correspondence. Hitherto the individual had not been explicitly considered at all except as a biological organism. . . . Individuality had seemed at first to be a mere biological notion, and then to be effaced under the conception of a social unity. From Comte's later point of view . . . there is a true science of man as individual; but it is posterior, not prior, to sociology. To this science Comte gave the name of Morality, making it the seventh in his hierarchy. . . . Theoretically, it must be

noted that Comte's new science is properly not ethics, but psychology of the individual. . . . But he failed . . . to distinguish it from moral philosophy. . . . Just as he does not discuss philosophically the criterion of scientific knowledge, but takes it for granted, so he does not discuss the criterion of action, but supposes it to emerge as a matter of course from his theoretical 'moral science'" (pp. 52 and 53).

³ As psychology, theory of knowledge, ontology and ethics, are all wanting in Comte's 'Positivism,' some have refused to call the latter a philosophy at all, regarding positivism merely as a general attitude of the philosophical mind, requiring to be scientifically defined but capable of very various interpretations and containing a number of aspects which have, since its proclamation, more and more