

of his task in a spirit similar to that of Hegel: he constructed a general scheme which should comprise and explain natural as well as mental, cosmic as well as human, phenomena. Uninfluenced probably by Leibniz, who introduced the idea of development into modern philosophy, he put this idea into a definite shape. In his 'First Principles' he elaborated a general scheme which he—in a manner analogous to that of Hegel—applied to the special objects and problems of physics, biology, and philosophy.

But the formula he started with was not purely logical as it was with Hegel. It was derived by a process of incomplete induction from a large mass of observed facts, and then generalised as applicable to the whole of existing things. This formula, which occurs with wearisome iteration all through Spencer's writings, can be expressed as the doctrine of the instability of the homogeneous, the tendency of every aggregate of elements and things to progress from a homogeneous but unconnected assemblage of similar units to a complex system of definite, differentiated, but connected parts. There is a continuous play of the processes of differentiation and integration. This formula finds nowhere a more suitable material for its application than in the phenomena of human society; the historical development of which, past, present, and future, is accordingly passed in review. This general scheme of Spencer's philosophy benefited much by the growing anthropological literature of the age, which deals with primitive man and savage races, and it was still more powerfully assisted by the theories of Lamarck,