

importance, inasmuch as he considers it to be not only a natural but a moral law, and this leads to a discussion on the nature of morality which he, in opposition to the view prevalent in the school of Kant and his successors, does not distinguish from law, but of which he rather considers law to be the authoritative expression. He works out a philosophy of history which recognises two distinct phases of what he calls social solidarity corresponding to two kinds of law. The first phase is homogeneous or mechanical; the second is organic. Resorting to analogies taken from biology, he shows how the change from the first to the second is brought about by the increasing volume and density of society necessitating a more intense struggle for existence and in consequence a partition of labour.

85.
Durkheim's
philosophy
of history.

In the first form of society there is no individual, but only a common, consciousness. Only in the second or organic state of society does the individual consciousness acquire importance and a field of action, but it retains the impress of the original and fundamental unity, *i.e.*, of the common consciousness; this shows itself in the existence of those altruistic tendencies which Comte took as facts, but which have been so puzzling to those who aimed at a monistic explanation of social phenomena. In the first form of society law is purely repressive; in the second it is restitutive.

The historical view which M. Durkheim takes of the

science of society but comes already as soon as, at the dawn of history, the purely physical connection of human beings is replaced by an artificial connection based upon statutes" (p. 110). "This is the

conscious mental influence of the governing class upon the whole of society, and with it the biological analogy ceases to be complete" (p. 292).