

## CHAPTER XI.

## OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT.

## I.

THE history of philosophical thought, as I have endeavoured to trace it in the foregoing chapters, has consisted in an attempt to deal with the whole subject by breaking it up into a series of more or less independent parts. The great philosophical problem—that concerning the Order or Connection of Things—has been divided into a variety of special problems. The unity of the whole, if such has been at all conspicuous, has consisted mainly in the relation in which the different problems stand to each other. This mode of treatment, which is not entirely original to this Work but has been adopted by other recent historians, is dictated by various considerations of which the two following are the most important.

To begin with, some among the problems of which I have treated have become in the course of the century of more general, indeed of popular, interest; marking in some instances burning questions of the present age. Others again have for the time being fallen into the

1.  
Special  
philosophi-  
cal prob-  
lems.

2.  
Change in  
their rela-  
tive im-  
portance.