

that the promised system would only have been a differently arranged exposition of the results arrived at in the 'Critiques.' But Lotze admits also, what is not clear in Kant's own undertaking, that his own as well as the Kantian way of approaching the philosophical problem involves an inevitable circle. Human reason is required to pass judgment as to the truthfulness of its own enunciations, and this by appealing to some of these as the ground for such judgment. With this in view Lotze limits, to begin with, the task of philosophy to an endeavour to bring connection and consistency into the whole of our ideas and observations, and he postpones an answer to the question whether this consistent whole, when attained, possesses any objective truth corresponding to the real nature of things. Kant had in an early part of his first 'Critique' arrived at the conclusion that the real nature of things, or what he termed the "Thing in itself," cannot be reached by our reasoning powers, inasmuch as our knowledge is based only on a varied and frequently unconnected subjective experience, and is, as such, occupied only with what appears: it is purely phenomenal and not real.

This result of Kant's early 'Critique' was that which attracted at the time undue attention, and provoked not only serious opposition but also a strenuous and long-sustained effort to find a way towards that knowledge of the nature of things, or of the "thing in itself," which Kant had pronounced to be unattainable. This involved a neglect of the other and more fruitful side of Kant's speculations, to which Lotze, following to some extent