

of this development has been the breaking up of the philosophical problem into a variety of distinct problems, such as I have dealt with in the foregoing chapters. We may say that the main cause of this new departure was the growth and diffusion of the scientific spirit on the one side, of the historical and critical spirit on the other. This new spirit, which is characteristic of nineteenth century thought, dispelled, for a time at least, what we may term the genuinely philosophical interest which is directed towards a unification of thought.

So far as the Kantian philosophy is concerned it was very early recognised that not only did it harbour an inherent dualism, but that, moreover, it was based upon certain facts and assumptions which were insufficiently proved or not even clearly set out. Notably the first 'Critique' started with definitions and distinctions adopted without sufficient justification from the Aristotelian logic and from the traditional psychology of the schools. With notions mainly drawn from these sources Kant attempted to criticise the notions of the traditional metaphysic of the schools and, at the same time, to reply to the doubts which had gradually sprung up through Locke's, Berkeley's, and Hume's original investigations. To many thinkers Kant's critical work did not appear to be thorough enough. It had, moreover, taken over from those various sources an amount of dry and unnecessary formalism which obscured the main points, made the study of his works unnecessarily laborious, and might possibly carry into the ultimate conclusions hidden errors which a more careful scrutiny would be able to correct. What was indeed wanted was a new and