

correcter psychology<sup>1</sup> and a new and less formal system of logic.

Both these desiderata were to some extent supplied by the labours of the English school. In it the first important work that was, after the lapse of nearly a century, again to affect German thought, was the treatise on 'Logic' by John Stuart Mill. That side of Mill's treatise which attracted attention in Germany was his

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British contributions in  
psychology  
and logic.

<sup>1</sup> In Germany this revision of the Kantian position was started, after the general ideas contained in the idealistic systems had lost their absorbing interest, mainly by two thinkers, Lotze and Trendelenburg, whose merits are being more and more acknowledged in the present day. One of the principal results of this revising process has been to bring out a marked difference in the conception as to the foundation of philosophical reasoning: Is it to be psychological or logical? Two schools have sprung up in Germany, termed psychological and anti-psychological. Of the former Prof. Franz Brentano (born 1838) may be considered the earliest and most pronounced representative; of the latter Prof. Edm. Husserl is the great protagonist, and this in conscious opposition to Brentano, under whose influence his earlier writings were composed. Both schools are much influenced by Lotze, who, probably first among modern thinkers, tried to bring some clearness into the subject, which was quite insufficiently treated by Kant. It belongs, however, so much to what Lotze would have termed the domestic affairs of the philosophical schools, that it hardly enters into a history of philosophical thought. To give the general reader some indication of the import of the controversy, I may refer to Lotze's distinction

of the three regions into which the experience of the contemplating mind may be divided—the region of definite things, the region of relations, and the region of judgments of value. Things exist or do not exist, relations obtain (are valid) or do not obtain, and judgments of value are either approval or disapproval. This distinction no doubt is ultimately a psychological one, *i.e.*, gained by reflection; but the question arises whether each of these regions of thought contains a sufficiently definite and permanent foundation to form the separate sciences or bodies of methodical thought and knowledge. The modern theory of development has introduced the idea of a continuous change, to which the human mind must be as susceptible as everything else. It is quite evident that so far as logic and morals are concerned, no satisfactory theory of either is possible without the belief in the existence of some unalterable truth and some supreme law of conduct. It is difficult to see how a thorough-going philosophy of Evolution can furnish these. To those who desire to be introduced into the details of the controversy as it exists in German literature, I recommend the first part of a tract by Dr Karl Heim, with the title: 'Psychologismus oder Anti-Psychologismus' (1902).