

In addition to this Fichte also took up the question of the ultimate source of knowledge and certainty of any kind. This he found in immediate evidence, or what he terms "an intellectual intuition." By this he meant that the beginning of all thought is a self-evidence, an intuition, or, as others would say, a Belief. Kant had already made use of this term in his third 'Critique'; but it was there suggested rather as contradictory to the view developed in his two earlier

again in the philosophy of the nineteenth century, and in this respect thinkers of very different schools, such as Lotze, Jodl, Eucken, and even Bradley, remind us continually of Fichte's philosophical ideals. In the working out of this highest philosophical programme, brought home to us again in the Lecture Syllabus of Prof. Sorley ('Gifford Lectures,' 1914, i. 1), the abstruse and forbidding terminology and analysis of Fichte's esoteric writings has been forgotten. Nevertheless it is impossible to read the exposition of such thinkers as the late Prof. Robert Adamson in this country, and still more of Prof. Windelband in Germany, and not to recognise that modern psychology is approaching the same problem in a less ambitious but possibly more promising manner. For a clear understanding I would recommend those who are deterred by Fichte's own expositions, which seem never to have given him full satisfaction, to read the chapter on Fichte in Adamson's 'Lectures on Modern Philosophy' (ed. by W. R. Sorley, 1903, vol. i. pp. 253-263), and the luminous chapters in Windelband's 'Die Blütezeit der Deutschen Philosophie' (2nd vol. of the 'History of Modern Philosophy,' 4th ed. 1907, §§ 63 and 67).

Windelband says: "From the fundamental principle of Fichte's doctrine there follows a result which places it, with all its dialectic consequences, in irreconcilable contrast with the common-sense view of things. It is better to mark this contrast quite clearly than to hide it: it contains the ultimate reason for all that has appeared and still appears paradoxical in the idealistic philosophy. The naïve consciousness can think of a function (process) only as the state or the activity of a functioning being. In whatever way this relation is represented, the ordinary way of reasoning thinks, first of things, and then of functions which they carry out. Fichte's doctrine turns this relation upside down: what we term 'things' it looks upon as products of activities. If we look upon activities as something which presupposes Being, for Fichte all Being is merely a product of an original doing. Function without a functioning something is for him the ultimate metaphysical principle." A direction of thought similar to this recurs again and again in modern philosophy—*e.g.*, in Wundt's critical destruction of the conception of substance, in the Energetics of Ostwald and others, in M. Bergson's conception of motion, &c.